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CONGRESS, THE INTERNET, AND THE 
INTRACTABLE PORNOGRAPHY 
PROBLEM: THE CHILD ONLINE 
PROTECTION ACT OF 1998 
TIMOTHY ZicKt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, sixteen million children under age eighteen were re-
ported to be using the Internet, nearly doubling the number of chil-
dren reported to be online in 1997.1 Over six million of these children 
were age twelve and under, up from the 3.5 million reported to be on-
line the previous year. 2 One of the perils for children of surfing the 
Internet, particularly the World Wide Web, is the proliferation of 
"adult" sites on the Web that promote and sell pornographic materials. 
There are currently estimated to be over 30,000 such sites, which gen-
erate nearly $1 billion in annual revenues.3 In 1998, it was estimated 
that nearly 70% of the traffic on the Web consisted of adult-oriented 
material that was unsuitable for children. 4 
In real space, the government can create physical and geographi-
cal "zones" within communities such that children are denied access to 
adult materials and shielded from adult activities. These zones are 
effective in real space, where concrete geographical boundaries exist 
and where it is possible to verify the age of persons who seek to enter 
adult zones. Thus, children can be prohibited from entering adult es-
tablishments or from purchasing certain adult goods, such as pornog-
t B.A., 1989, Indiana University; J.D., 1992, Georgetown University Law Center. 
Law clerk to the Honorable Levin H. Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge, United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The author would like to thank Madeleine Timin 
for her helpful comments and careful reading of earlier versions. The author also grate-
fully acknowledges the assistance of the editorial staff of the Creighton Law Review. 
Any errors are the author's alone. 
1. The 1997 American Internet User Survey: Realities Beyond the Hype (Apr. 9, 
1999) <http://etrg.findsvp.com/interneUfindf.html>. These figures include children on-
line from any location including home, school, libraries, homes of friends, and relatives. 
See id. Children use the Internet for a wide variety of activities, including homework, 
informal learning, browsing the World Wide Web, playing games, corresponding with 
friends by e-mail, placing messages on electronic bulletin boards, and participating in 
chat rooms. 
2. The 1997 American Internet User Survey, supra note 1, at <http://etrg.findsvp. 
com/interneUfindf.html>. 
3. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 6-7 (1998). 
4. See id. (citing The Net's Dirty Little Secret: Sex Sells (Upside Publishing Co., 
Apr. 1998)). 
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raphy, that are deemed harmful to them.5 The Supreme Court has 
recognized, as part of its First Amendment jurisprudence, that gov-
ernments can regulate the location - either through concentration or 
dispersion - of establishments such as adult movie theaters in order 
to alleviate "secondary effects" on the community, like crime and dete-
riorating property values, and to improve generally the quality of ur-
ban life.6 
By comparison, "cyberspace," where many of us now also "live," 
presently contains neither geographical boundaries nor methods by 
which users can be instantly and reliably identified.7 The absence of 
geography and identity in cyberspace confounds those who wish to 
protect children, as in real space, by creating "red light" cyber-dis-
tricts, adults-only Web pages, or, indeed, any type of zone based upon 
the content of speech posted on the Internet. Information providers 
who post material on the Internet cannot yet reliably determine the 
age of users who access those materials. Thus, the only certain 
method for denying children access to "adult" materials on the In-
ternet is to deny adults such access as well - a significant burden on 
the exercise of adults' free speech rights. 
Several current projects, including gateway technology, ratings 
systems, and domain naming systems, may eventually lead to the rep-
lication of the boundary and identity dimensions of real space and cre-
ate cyber-communities that look something like real space 
communities.8 Should these projects prove workable, it may be possi-
ble to create viable adult zones in cyberspace. Without them, or at 
least something like them, it will be virtually impossible to transfer 
real space zoning principles to cyberspace. In cyberspace, at least in-
5. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631, 638-39 (1968) (upholding a 
state law prohibiting the sale of materials obscene as to minors under 17 years old). 
6. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43, 48 (1986) (up-
holding a zoning ordinance "prohibiting adult motion picture theaters from locating 
within 1000 feet of any residential zone, single-or-multiple-family dwelling, church, 
park, or school"); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52-53, 72-73 
(1976) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting the operation of any "adult" movie theater, 
bookstore, or similar establishments within 1000 feet of any other such establishment, 
or within 500 feet of a residential area). 
7. According to David R. Johnson and David Post: "Cyberspace has no territori-
ally based boundaries, because the cost and speed of message transmission on the Net is 
almost entirely independent of physical location." David R. Johnson & David Post, Law 
and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370 (1996). 
Johnson and Post also note: "The Net enables transactions between people who do not 
know, and in many cases cannot know, each other's physical location." ld. at 1371. 
8. For a proposal for zoning based upon domain name technology, see April Mara 
Major, Internet Red Light Districts: A Domain Name Proposal For Regulatory Zoning Of 
Obscene Content, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. 21 (1997). The current trend 
toward the "zoning" of cyberspace is discussed by Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403 (1996). 
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sofar as the First Amendment is concerned, it appears that the law, 
which generally is accustomed to leading, will, at least for the foresee-
able future, have to follow and be guided by technology.9 
The notion that software codes can limit and, in some cases, 
trump, legal codes in cyberspace was formally enshrined as a principle 
of constitutional law in Reno v. ACLU.10 In Reno, the Supreme Court 
struck down portions of the Communications Decency Act (the "CDA") 
under which Congress sought to impose criminal liability on anyone 
communicating on the Internet who knowingly distributed "indecent" 
or "patently offensive" materials to those under eighteen years of 
age.11 Applying strict scrutiny to the CDA, the Supreme Court held 
that while the goal of zoning "indecent" and "patently offensive" 
materials was undoubtedly a compelling one, Congress went too far 
and too fast in its effort to incorporate real space zoning principles into 
the realm of cyberspace.12 The Court recognized that current techno-
logical limitations make it impossible to bar minors'. access to harmful 
adult-oriented materials on the Internet without also barring adults 
from engaging in constitutionally protected speech.13 This is so, the 
Court reasoned, because current technology cannot duplicate in cyber-
space the critical. aspects of geography and identification that are 
present in real space.14 The government, pointing to the almost daily 
innovations in user-based blocking software and gateway technology, 
urged the Court to recognize that technological innovation was fast 
making Internet zoning a realistic solution to the problem of children's 
access to cybersmut.15 Highlighting the unique nature of the Internet 
as a medium of free expression and the unprecedented nature of the 
government's proposed restrictions on free speech in cyberspace, the 
Court, however, refused to uphold Congress' massive zoning effort, 
which covered the entire Internet and was backed by the threat of 
criminal sanctions, on the mere promise of future technological 
advances.16 
9. There are many areas- searches under the Fourth Amendment come readily 
to mind - where the government has reaped the benefits of technological advances. 
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
thermal infrared surveillance is not an unconstitutional search). 
10. 521 u.s. 844 (1997). 
11. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858-60, 882 (1997). 
12. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868, 874-79. 
13. ld. at 874, 876. 
14. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who filed an opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, offered the most explicit discussion on this point. She focused on the 
"twin characteristics of geography and identity" that have enabled effective adult zoning 
in real space. Id. at 886, 889 (O'Connor J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
15. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
16. Id. at 849-53, 858-61, 874. 
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While technological advances, spurred by market forces, continue 
apace, none have undermined Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's obser-
vation in Reno that the Internet remains "largely unzoned - and un-
zoneable."17 Nonetheless, despite the clarity of the Reno Court's 
message and the absence of technological advances sufficient to bring 
about effective speech zoning on the Internet, in October 1998 Con-
gress passed and President Clinton signed the Child Online Protection 
Act ("COPA").18 COPA requires, by way of criminal conviction and 
heavy civil fines, that those "engaged in the business" of selling mater-
ials on the World Wide Web that are "harmful to minors" restrict ac-
cess to such materials by anyone under the age ofseventeen.19 COPA 
is Congress' latest answer to the "intractable obscenity problem"20 
posed by the unique characteristics of the Internet. 
Like the CDA, COPA was immediately dismissed by many as lit-
tle more than election-year pandering to conservative voters.21 De-
tractors have variously dubbed COPA "CDAII," "Son of CDA," or "The 
Congress Doesn't Understand the Internet Act." COPA, however, is a 
far more modest zoning project than the CDA. Unlike the CDA, which 
17. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
18. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (to be 
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-31) [herinafter COPA]. 
19. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1)). 
20. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part). Prior to Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), 
in which the Supreme Court set forth the current governing test for "obscenity'' under 
the First Amendment, the Court struggled to find a workable solution to the "intracta-
ble obscenity problem." See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957). In the 
CDA and COPA, Congress has struggled with speech of a different stripe - that which 
is not obscene under Miller, but is deemed "harmful to minors" and therefore subject to 
regulation. 
21. COPA was immediately challenged in court. The day after President Clinton 
signed COPA into law, a consortium led by the American Civil Liberties Union filed a 
lawsuit in a Pennsylvania federal court challenging COPA, both on its face and as ap-
plied, as a violation of the First Amendment. See Complaint, ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-
5591 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1998) (on file with author). The plaintiffs are: The ACLU, An-
drogyny Books, Inc., d/b/a/ A Different Light Bookstores, American Booksellers Founda-
tion For Free Expression, Artnet Worldwide Corporation, Blackstripe, Addazi, Inc., dlb/ 
a Condomania, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center, 
Free Speech Media, Internet Content Coalition, OBGYN.Net, Philadelphia Gay News, 
Planetout Corporation, Powell's Bookstores, RIOTGRRL, Salon Internet, Inc., and West 
Stock, Inc. On November 19, 1998, the district court granted plaintiffs' application for a 
temporary restraining order. See Memorandum and Order of Reed, J., ACLU v. Reno, 
No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (on file with author). On February 1, 1999, the district 
court held that plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, 
including demonstration of a likelihood of success on the merits, and enjoined enforce-
ment of COPA pending trial. See Memorandum and Order of Reed, J. Reno (No. 98-
5591) (on file with author). Unlike the CDA, which contained a provision allowing expe-
dited appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court, see 47 U.S.C. § 561(a) (Supp. 
1998), COP A's fate must be determined through the usual appellate process, including 
the Supreme Court's discretionary review. On April2, 1999, the Department of Justice 
filed a notice of appeal from the district court's preliminary injunction. 
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sought to prohibit "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech from 
reaching minors anywhere in cyberspace, COPA was specifically 
designed by Congress to regulate and penalize only those who partici-
pate in the commercial market for materials deemed obscene with re-
spect to minors in only one of the Internet's many fora- the World 
Wide Web. Congress apparently interpreted Reno as an invitation to 
·return to the drafting table, and created COPA with what it believed 
to be a literal blueprint provided by the Court. 22 Because COPA was 
fashioned specifically to address the Court's concerns, it cannot be as 
readily dismissed as the CDA. 
In Part II of this article, I will examine the current state of In-
ternet technology as it relates to the aspects of geography and iden-
tity, the two critical components of effective zoning laws.23 In doing 
so, I will draw on many of the 123 separate findings of fact made by 
the three-judge district court panel in Reno v. ACLU. 24 Because Con-
gress enacted COPA specifically to respond to the Reno decision, in 
Part III, I will review the ill-fated CDA and the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis of Congress' first attempted Internet zoning project.25 After ex-
amining COPA in Part IV, I conclude that despite Congress' narrower 
brush, the most recent blueprint it has fashioned for an adult zone on 
the Web will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.26 Indeed, Con-
gress fundamentally misconstrued Reno as an invitation to try. again 
to regulate Internet speech. Rather, given the infancy of the Internet, 
rapid advances in technology enabling users (i.e., parents) themselves 
to zone speech, and the fundamental uncertainty concerning the 
shape Internet communities will ultimately assume, the Court's clear 
intention was to caution Congress that any content-based restrictions 
on Internet speech would likely be struck down. 
Nevertheless, if history and politics offer any window to the fu-
ture, Congress will remain undeterred and COPA will not be its last 
Internet zoning project. Thus, in Part V, I will propose an approach to 
future legislation that satisfies Congress' need to protect children from 
harmful materials on the Internet, while preserving the democratic 
nature of the medium and respecting the limitations on zoning im-
posed by technology and established First Amendment jurispru-
dence.27 I will argue, however, that the best solution to the Internet's 
22. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998) (stating that COPA "has been carefully 
drafted to respond to the Supreme Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 
(1997)"). 
23. See infra notes 28-106 and accompanying text. 
24. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-49 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
25. See infra notes 107-96 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 197-299 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 300-09 and accompanying text. 
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"intractable pornography problem" is not to impose criminally sanc-
tionable government censorship, but rather for Congress to encourage 
the development of technology that allows the adult user (i.e., parent) 
to determine what types of cyberspeech should or should not be re-
ceived in the home. 
II. GEOGRAPHY, IDENTITY, AND THE INTERNET 
As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring and dissenting opin-
ion in Reno, in real space there is no need to question whether "an 
adult zone, once created, would succeed in preserving adults' access 
while denying minors' access to the regulated speech."28 The efficacy 
of adult zones in real space can be assumed, because geography and 
identity enable proprietors of adult establishments to permit adults to 
enter while preventing children, who generally cannot conceal their 
age, from coming inside.29 In addition, legislators can lessen the 
chances that children will encounter such establishments by zoning 
them away from schools and by concentrating them in areas that chil-
dren are unlikely to frequent. ao 
By contrast, "Netizens" travel the Web31 rapidly, seamlessly, and 
anonymously, often visiting multiple sites whose primary geographi-
cal attributes are addresses somewhere in cyberspace and a common 
computer code that allows users to access data from their individual 
computers. Without perfect computer codes designed to enable pre-
cise discrimination in the access to and distribution of speech, regula-
tion of speech in cyberspace is imprecise, and therefore, 
constitutionally suspect. Simply put, it is, at least at present, more 
clifficult to regulate bytes than atoms. There are no cyber-bouncers or 
cyber-proprietors standing at the entrance of adult establishments on 
the Internet to restrict access to zones by age. Indeed, although there 
are borders in cyberspace, there are as yet no boundaries or walls.32 
28. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 889 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part). 
29. See Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 
869, 886 (1996). 
30. As Professor Lessig has pointed out, most of real space is effectively zoned, 
whether through legislation or social norms and values. He stated: "In general, you 
don't see homeless people wandering through Barneys; you don't see children in bars; 
you don't see bars in residential neighborhoods; you don't see houses next to factories." 
Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 887 (emphasis omitted). 
31. Because COPA seeks only to regulate speech on the World Wide Web, I focus in 
this section primarily on that Internet forum. For a full discussion of other Internet 
fora, including e-mail and newsgroups, the reader is referred to the detailed findings of 
fact made by the district court panel in Reno. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49. 
32. See Lessig, The Zone of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. at 1408 ("Borders are not 
boundaries; they divide one system from another just as Pennsylvania is divided from 
Ohio."). 
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Once material is placed in cyberspace, it is available to all who have 
access to a computer and modem. These distinctive Internet charac-
teristics pose unique difficulties for erecting content-based zones in 
cyberspace that comport with constitutional principles developed in 
real space. 
A. THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE INTERNET 
The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a gi-
ant network that interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked 
computer networks.33 It is infinite space that plays host to a decen-
tralized, global medium of communications linking people, institu-
tions, corporations, and governments around the world.34 While 
estimates are difficult to confirm, the Internet is currently believed to 
connect more than 159 countries and over 100 million users.35 This 
international system of communication allows tens of millions of peo-
ple with access to it to exchange information - usually 
instantaneously.36 
As Professor Lawrence Lessig, a leading commentator on cyber-
space law, has noted, what is central about the Internet's present ar-
chitecture is "the anarchy it preserves."37 No single entity or group of 
entities controls the material made available on the Internet or limits, 
or is able to limit, the ability of others to access such materials.38 
Rather, the range of digital information available to Internet users is 
individually created, maintained, controlled, and located on millions 
of separate individual computers around the world. Once an informa-
tion provider posts its content on the Internet, it has no way to pre-
vent that content from entering any community.39 This enables one 
who posts information on the Internet to reach a potentially world-
wide audience. 
33. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
34. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831. 
35. Id. The district court found that "[i)n all, reasonable estimates are that as 
many as 40 million people around the world can and do access the enormously flexible 
communication Internet medium. That figure is expected to grow to 200 million In-
ternet users by the year 1999." Id. There is some controversy surrounding the esti-
mates of the size of the Internet. See, e.g., D.L. Hoffman, W.D. Kalsbeek & T.P. Novak, 
"Internet and Web Use in the United States: Baselines for Commercial Development," 
Communications of the ACM, 36-46 (Dec. 1996). 
36. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831. 
37. Lessig, 48 STAN L. REv. at 1408. Professor Lessig has explained that cyber-
space is not in a state of pure anarchy. Rather, given the crudeness of the "technologies 
of control," cyberspace is "a place of relative freedom" in which "control is exercised 
through the ordinary tools of human regulation - through social norms, and social 
stigma; through peer pressure, and reward." ld. at 1407. 
38. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 853. 
39. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844. 
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The Internet was designed to be a decentralized, yet linked, net-
work of computers capable of rapidly transmitting communications 
without direct human involvement or control.40 It is comprised of 
multiple links between computers and computer networks. Communi-
cations sent over this redundant series oflinked computers may travel 
any number of routes to their ultimate destination.41 The Internet 
was designed such that these communications could be re-routed if 
one or more individual links were damaged or otherwise 
unavailable. 42 
Those who operate within this primitive architecture or geogra-
phy utilize a wide variety of methods of communication and informa-
tion exchange.43 Among them are one-to-one messaging ("e-mail"), 
one-to-many messaging, distributed message databases, real-time 
communication, and remote information retrieval (such as the World 
Wide Web).44 Most of these methods of communication can be used to 
transmit text, images, data, and sound.45 The variety of content 
posted on the Internet "is as diverse as human thought."46 A signifi-
cant percentage of that content - perhaps 40% or more - originates 
outside the United States.47 
ThE. World Wide Web is currently the most popular way to provide 
and retrieve information on the Internet. 48 The Web was created to 
serve as the basis for a global, online repository of knowledge, contain-
ing information from a variety of sources and accessible to Internet 
users around the world.49 Because all of the computers on which Web 
40. Id. at 831. 
41. Id. at 831-32. 
42. Id. at 831. 
43. "Primitive" is used as in the sense of having great potential for the develop-
ment of a segregated geography much like real space but as yet, no boundaries or dis-
tinct communities. 
44. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 834. 
45. ld. 
46. Id. at 842. It is estimated that there are over 320 million pages of content on 
Web sites - a "searchable 15-billion word encyclopedia." Steve Lawrence & C. Lee 
Giles, Searching the World Wide Web, 280 SciENCE 98-100 (Apr. 3, 1998). 
47. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 848. The Internet is an international communications 
medium. Many dozens of countries and territories are represented by 242 international 
hosts and international participation has been increasing for several years. See Mark 
Lottor, Internet Domain Survey July 1998: Distribution by Top-Level Domain Name By 
Host Count <www.nw.com/zone/WWW/dist-bynum.html>. 
48. Because Congress focused in COPA on regulation of the Web, I will focus in 
this section primarily on the geographical and identity characteristics of that forum. 
The reader is encouraged to refer to the detailed findings of the district court in Reno 
concerning electronic mail, automatic mailing list services, newsgroups, and chat 
rooms. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 830-49. 
49. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836. 
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information is stored are connected to the Internet by the same digital 
protocol, all of the information is part of a single body of knowledge. 5° 
Physically, then, the Web "is a series of documents stored in dif-
ferent computers" around the world.51 Anyone with access to the In-
ternet and appropriate software can post content on the Web. The 
Web comprises millions of separate but interconnected ''Web sites," 
which in turn may have hundreds of separate "Web pages" that dis-
play content provided by particular persons or organizations.52 Any 
Internet user anywhere in the world with the proper software can cre-
ate her own Web page, view Web pages posted by others, and then 
read text, look at images and video, and listen to sounds posted at 
these sites. 
User-oriented navigation on the Web consists of visiting a series 
of Web sites in order to browse or search for a variety of content. To 
gain access to the information available on the Web, a person uses a 
Web ''browser"- software such as Netscape Navigator, Mosaic, or In-
ternet Explorer- to display, print and download documents that use 
hypertext transfer protocol ("http"), the standard Web formatting lan-
guage. Each document on the Web has an address (much like a tele-
phone number) that allows users to find and retrieve it.53 Most Web 
documents also contain "links" - short sections of text or image that 
refer and link to another document.54 When selected by the user, the 
linked document is automatically displayed, wherever in the world it 
is actually stored.55 The Web was designed such that a link is fol-
lowed with a maximum target time of one tenth of a second. 56 
Through the use of these links from one computer to another and from 
one document to another, the Web for the first time unifies the diverse 
and voluminous information made available by millions of users on 
the Internet into a single body of knowledge that can easily be 
searched and accessed. 57 
While there are no business "districts" on the Web, many organi-
zations and businesses have "home pages" on the Web. 58 These pages 
contain a set of links designed to provide information concerning the 
50. The protocol is referred to as "W3C." ld. 
51. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836. 
52. Id. 
53. ld. The address is known as a Universal Resource LoCator or "URL." 
54. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 837. 
57. ld. at 836, 837. 
58. Over 10.3 million, or 28%, of the 36.7 million Internet hosts are commercial 
domains (.com). See Lottor, supra note 47, at <www.nw.com/zone!WWW/dist-
bynum.html>. As the Internet is changing at such a rapid rate, and because it is not 
subject to any centralized authority, it is not possible to know with any assurance the 
number of sites that are operated by for-profit ventures. 
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organization, and through the links guide the user directly or indi-
rectly to information about or relevant to that organization.59 Web 
publishers60 may allow their Web sites to remain open to the general 
pool of all Internet users, or they may close them to all except those 
who have advance authorization to enter the site.61 Many publishers 
choose to maintain open sites in order to give their information the 
widest possible audience.62 Should a publisher wish to restrict access 
to a site, she must assign specific user names and passwords as a pre-
requisite to access.sa 
As they have with other new media, entrepreneurs are beginning 
to explore the business opportunities available on the Web. While it is 
not possible to know the precise number of sites that are run by profit-
making ventures, it is estimated that there may be more than one mil-
lion such enterprises currently operating on the Web.64 Like real 
space businesses, these cyber-businesses seek to generate revenue in 
several ways. Many Web publishers generate revenue through adver-
tising on their sites, much as a magazine publisher will do in real 
space. In addition, content providers such as online booksellers, music 
stores, and providers of art services allow potential customers to 
browse their sites for free- similar to browsing in real space book-
stores and art galleries - in the hope that users will purchase goods 
on their visit. Finally, some online content providers seek to make a 
profit by charging their content contributors, although users still may 
access their content for free.s5 
59. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 836. 
60. Information is said to be "published" on the Web when it is made available. ld. 
at 837. Publishing "simply requires that the 'publisher' has a computer connected to the 
Internet and that the computer is running the W3C server software." Id. 
61. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 837. 
62. Id. 
63. ld. 
64. See, e.g., Netcraft Web Server Survey <http://www.netcraft.com/Survey/> (pro-
viding data on the growth in Internet web sites). 
65. Professor Donna L. Hoffman, who submitted a declaration in support of plain-
tiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order in the lawsuit challenging COPA and who 
testified at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, stated that 
there are five general business models operating on the Web: (1) the Internet presence 
model, which involves no direct sales or advertising but is used by a business to raise 
customer awareness of the name and products of the Web site operator; (2) the adver-
tiser supported or sponsored model, in which nothing is for sale, content is provided for 
free, and advertising on the site is the source of all revenue; (3) the fee based or sub-
scription model in which users are charged a fee before accessing content; (4) the effi-
ciency or effective gains model, by which a company uses the Web to decrease operating 
costs; and (5) the online storefront, in which a consumer buys a product or service di-
rectly over the Web. Professor Hoffman testified that the most popular business model 
on the Web is the advertiser supported or sponsored model, and that the fee based 
model was the least popular on the Web. See Memorandum Opinion Granting Prelimi-
nary Injunction, ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1999). 
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The content on the Web is not limited to published documents. 
The Web also allows individuals to communicate in discussion groups 
and chat rooms and by e-mail using hypertext transfer protocol. Many 
Web sites use software applications, sometimes called "middleware," 
to provide users of their sites with access to discussion groups and 
chat rooms. Discussion groups allow users of computer networks to 
post messages onto a public computerized bulletin board and to read 
and respond to messages posted by others in the discussion group.66 
Discussion groups have been organized to cover virtually every topic 
imaginable.67 Chat rooms allow a user to engage in simultaneous con-
versations with another user or group of users by typing messages and 
reading the messages typed by others participating in the "chat.1'68 
Online discussion groups and chat rooms create a new global public 
forum where individuals can associate and communicate with others 
who have common interests, obtain instant answers to research ques-
tions, and engage in discussion or debate on an almost limitless vari-
ety of topics.69 It is also possible to set up an account for electronic 
mail on the Web. Several commercial Web sites, such as Yahoo and 
Hotmail, will provide free e-mail accounts to individuals. These ac-
counts allow individuals to use the Web to create, send, and receive e-
mails with other individuals. Such accounts allow individuals who do 
not possess their own computer or Internet access account to establish 
a permanent e-mail address and to correspond with other individuals 
by using the Web at public libraries and other public Internet access 
sites. 
B. IDENTITY AND THE INTERNET 
Web browsers, utilizing what Professor Lessig has described as 
the "technologies ofprivacy,"70 determine what others will know about 
them. As Professor Lessig has written: 
One enters cyberspace as one wants. One can enter identify-
ing who one is, or one can hide who one is. One can enter 
speaking a language that anyone can understand, or one can 
encrypt the language one speaks, so only the intended listen-
ers can understand what one says. What others see of you is 
within your control; what others understand of you is within 
your control as well. 71 
66. Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. 
67. ld. 
68. Id. at 851-52. 
69. Id. 
70. Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 876. 
71. Id. 
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This is a power different in both degree and character from our ability 
as citizens in real space to, on occasion, mask our identities. In cyber-
space, we have the ability to hide absolutely who we are. Thus, 
"[c]yberspace is a place that maximizes both social and individual 
plasticity, which means it is a place that determines very little about 
what others must know about you."72 
Software technology has not yet managed to alter the fundamen-
tal "plasticity" of the Internet. There is currently no effective way to 
determine the identity or age of a user who is accessing material 
through e-mail, newsgroups, chat rooms, and the like.73 An e-mail ad-
dress, for example, provides no authoritative information concerning 
the addressee - indeed, some even use e-mail "aliases" to conceal 
their identities. 74 Thus, information providers operating in these var-
ious fora have no way of knowing the age of those who are consuming 
their materials. 75 
Technology does exist, however, that allows the operator of a Web 
site to interrogate users concerning their identity and age prior to 
granting access to a site.76 An ''html" document can include a fill-in-
the blank "form" to request information from a visitor to a Web site.77 
The information collected can then be "transmitted back to the Web 
server and be processed by a computer program, usually a Common 
Gateway Interface (cgi) script."78 The cgi script enables a Web server 
to process the form and thereby "screen visitors by requesting a credit 
card number or adult password."79 Based upon the information pro-
vided, "[t]he Web server could then grant or deny access to the infor-
mation sought."80 
The principal difficulty with an age verification system based 
upon cgi script is that it is unavailable to content providers who pub-
lish information on the Web through "one of the large commercial on-
line services, such as America Online," because the server software 
available to subscribers of these services cannot at present process cgi 
scripts.81 These commercial online services together have nearly 
twenty million subscribers. Thus, for a great many Web publishers, 
cgi script verification is not a viable option for limiting access to their 
Web sites. 
72. Id. at 877. 
73. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845. 
74. ld. 
75. Reno, 521 U.S. at 855. 





81. ld. at 845-46. 
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· For those publishers who do not post their material on the Web 
through one of the major commercial services, there are several other 
difficulties associated with requiring that users provide a credit card 
number to gain access to a site. First, there is currently no reliable 
method to verify that the card number used is valid prior to allowing a 
user to enter a site.82 Second, even if such technology were available, 
age verification by means of credit card would remain economically 
and practically unavailable to most non-commercial content provid-
ers.83 Verification agencies will not process a credit card unless it ac-
companies a commercial transaction. 84 Third, using credit card 
verification as a surrogate for age would impose significant economic 
costs on non-commercial and commercial entities alike.85 Many com-
mercial establishments operating in cyberspace do not charge - and 
do not wish to charge - for access to their speech. Fourth, credit card 
verification would substantially alter the presently seamless retrieval 
of information on the Internet.86 Information would no longer be in-
stantaneously accessible to users, who would have to provide a credit 
card number each time they wanted to access a particular site con-
taining blocked material. Finally, imposition of a credit card require-
ment would bar all adults who do not have a credit card- including 
many users who are accessing the Internet from locations outside the 
United States- from accessing any blocked material.87 
Content providers might also restrict access to their sites by re-
quiring an adult password, access code, or digital certificate to be pro-
vided prior to permitting entry. A few commercial enterprises will, for 
a fee, verify a user's age and distribute adult passwords or access 
codes.88 These costs are either incurred by users when they apply for 
passwords, or are passed along to users by the Web server. Establish-
ing and maintaining an age verification system would impose substan-
tial economic and administrative costs on content providers, who must 
purchase and implement the software necessary to screen the pass-
words, codes, and age certificates, as well as users who must obtain a 
82. I d. at 846. Apparently, Vis~ and Mastercard are currently developing software 
to make possible the online verification of credit card numbers. I d. 
83. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846. 
84. ld. 
85. ld. 
86. ld. The Reno district court noted that both plaintiffs' expert and the govern-
ment's expert agreed on this point. The government's expert testified that "people will 
not put up with a minute" delay in retrieval. Id. Plaintiffs' expert testified that exces-
sive delay disrupts the "flow" on the Internet and inhibits both "hedonistic" and "goal-
directed" browsing. Id. 
87. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 846. 
88. ld. at 846-47. 
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password from one of the commercial services.89 In addition, many 
content providers strive to make their materials available to a wide 
audience free of charge, a goal that would be significantly undermined 
if age verification is required for access.9° Finally, because an age ver-
ification system would require users to present a credit card or other 
form of personal identification over the Internet prior to even entering 
a site, many users likely would be discouraged from visiting certain 
sites to retrieve information, particularly if those sites are thought to 
contain controversial or "indecent" material.91 
There are a number of additional technologically feasible methods 
of zoning material on the Internet based upon its content. One such 
method; "tagging," would require content providers to label all of their 
prohibited. material by imbedding a string of characters, such as 
''XXX" for obscene materials, in either the URL92 or HTML.93 For tag-
ging to be effective, content providers would be required to review all 
of their online content to determine whether the banned speech ap-
pears in any file, and then embed a tag in that file. 94 Once this bur-
densome task was accomplished, 95 a user could install software on his 
or her computer to screen for any tagged material. 96 This process 
would, of course, require content providers to make a judgment as to 
whether their files contain any of the proscribed speech. Alterna-
tively, "a content provider could tag its entire site."97 Blocking or 
screening software - programs designed to be installed on a user's 
home computer - could then be utilized to prevent a user from acces-
sing any of the information on the site. To be effective, tagging re-
quires that: (1) content providers agree on what speech is prohibited, 
89. Id. at 847. The district court noted that "[t)here was testimony that the costs 
would be prohibitive even for a commercial entity such as Hot Wired, the online version 
of Wired magazine." I d. 
90. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847. 
91. Id. Commercial information providers, many of whom seek to make a profit 
from advertising revenues, obviously depend upon the largest possible audience being 
permitted to enter their sites. As the district court noted, "[t)here is concern by com-
mercial content providers that age verification requirements would decrease advertising 
and revenue because advertisers depend on a demonstration that the sites are widely 
available and frequently visited." Id. 
92. A Universal Resource Locator ("URL") is the address for a particular Web site. 
93. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847. HTML is the common information storage for-
mat by which the Web links together disparate information. 
94. See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847. 
95. Id. The district court noted that the Carnegie Library, for example, "would be 
required to hire numerous additional employees" to screen its entire online content for 
arguably prohibited speech. Id. The court found that "[t)he cost and effort would be 
substantial for the Library and frequently prohibitive for others." Id. 
96. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847. 
97. ld. at 848. 
1999] THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT 1161 
and (2) blocking software currently exist that can recognize an agreed-
upon tag.98 Neither of these requirements can currently be met.99 
Another potential publisher-based solution to the identity prob-
lem is Domain Name System ("DNS") zoning. Currently, any size net-
work can join the Internet by applying for membership in two domain 
hierarchies: organizational and geographical.100 The organizational 
hierarchy is divided into seven so-called "top-level" domains. 101 For 
example, commercial sites are required to register with Network Solu-
tions, Inc. in the ".com" top-level domain. DNS enables each domain 
to be administered by a different organization.102 There are currently 
several proposals to create a generic top-level domain on the Internet 
that would be specifically reserved for adult content.103 For example, 
sites that contain adult material might be placed in a new domain 
such as ".adult" or ".xxx." It would then be incumbent upon software 
manufacturers to develop blocking software to deny access to all sites 
in the new domain. Of course, as with tagging, this potential solution 
would require that judgments be made concerning whether the con-
tent of a site requires that it be located within the new domain and 
would further require that software be developed to block sites based 
upon the new domain names. 
There are also a number of promising blocking or filtering tech-
niques currently available that allow the user to decide what type of 
content he or she will allow to be accessed from a computer. These 
techniques vary: they can be as simple as stand-alone software that 
blocks access to particular sites or as complicated as software pro-
grams that review each page of material posted on the Web based on a 
set of key words.104 As already mentioned, some blocking technology 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. Major, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. at 24. 
101. The seven top-level domains are: (1)" .com," (2) ".edu," (3) ".gov," (4) ".mil," (5) 
".int," (6) ".net," and (7) ".org." Id. 
102. See Major, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. at 25-29. On November 25, 
1998, the Department of Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers ("ICANN") signed a memorandum of understanding in which they agreed 
to transfer responsibility for the Internet domain names system from the United States 
government to a recently created private non-profit corporation. (The MOA is located at 
www.ntia.doc.gov.). The agreement calls for Commerce and ICANN to, among other 
things, oversee policy established for determining whether new generic top-level do-
mains should be added. 
103. See Major, 16 J. MARsHALL J. CoMPUTER & INFO. L. at 25-29. 
104. In Reno, the court noted that "[t]he World Wide Web Consortium has launched 
the PICS ('Platform for Internet Content Selection') program in order to develop techni-
cal standards that would support parents' ability to filter and screen material that their 
children see on the Web." Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 838. The Consortium expects that 
PICS will allow third parties, as well as individual publishers, to rate content on the 
Internet. See id. 
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can be used in conjunction with the "tagging'' and DNS methods. The 
chief difficulty with the current blocking software is that it may screen 
too broadly for "indecent" materials - screening for ''breast," for ex-
ample, may result in the blocking of useful information on breast can-
cer. Parental control software also cannot currently screen for 
sexually explicit images unaccompanied by suggestive text. 105 Never-
theless, despite these limitations, "currently available user-based 
software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents 
can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other 
material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children 
will soon be widely available."106 
III. ROUND I: THE COMMUNICATIONS DEQENCY ACT 
("CDA") 
In years past, the Supreme Court has examined government re-
strictions on speech in a variety of media contexts, including radio, 107 
newspapers,108 telephones,1°9 and cable television.11o In Reno v. 
ACLU, 111 the Court addressed for the first time the constitutionality 
of governmental regulation of speech in the context of what it called 
"the vast democratic fora of the Internet."112 Its examination was pre-
cipitated by a challenge to two provisions of the CDA whereby Con-
gress sought to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently 
offensive" material on the Internet, and was informed by extensive 
findings of fact made by a three-judge district court panel, many of 
which were discussed in Part II, concerning the Internet and the cur-
rent state of cyberspace technology.113 As Congress apparently read 
Reno quite literally as a blueprint for erecting a constitutional adult 
cyberzone, and because determination of the constitutionality of 
COPA will turn in large part on application of the Reno decision, I 
105. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 842. 
106. ld. 
107. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729, 750-51 (1978) (upholding an 
FCC regulation of the broadcast of a "Filthy Words" monologue). 
108. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (allowing criti-
cism of public officials to be regulated by civil libel only if the plaintiff shows actual 
malice). 
109. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (up-
holding prohibition of obscene "dial-a-porn" messages). 
110. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737, 
768 (1996) (upholding an FCC order permitting an operator to prohibit patently offen-
sive or indecent programming on leased access channels). 
111. 521 u.s. 844 (1997). 
112. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-69 (1997). 
113. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-61. The findings were in large part the result of a de-
tailed stipulation prepared by the parties. Id. at 849. 
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examine closely in this Part the CDA and the Supreme Court's analy-
sis of that statute. 
A. THE CDA's STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The CDA had a less-than-impressive legislative pedigree. In-
serted as Title V of The Telecommunications Act of 1996,114 its provi-
sions were, as the Supreme Court noted, "either added in executive 
committee after the hearings were concluded or as amendments of-
fered during floor debate on the legislation."115 No hearings were held 
on the two provisions that became law and were subsequently chal-
lenged in Reno.ll6 
The first provision of the CDA challenged in Reno prohibited the 
knowing transmission by means of any "telecommunications device" 
over the Internet of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient 
under eighteen years of age.117 The statute did not define "indecent" 
in any respect. Violation of this provision carried penalties of impris-
onment of no more than two years or a fine, or both.118 
The second CDA provision prohibited knowingly sending or dis-
playing over the Internet, by means of an interactive computer ser-
vice, "patently offensive" messages in a manner that is available to a 
114. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-61, 110 Stat. 56, 
133-43. 
115. Reno, 521 U.S. at 858. 
116. ld. at 858 n.24. 
117. ld. at 859; Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 
(1998) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(l)-(2)) [herinafter COPA). Section 223(a) 
provides, in pertinent part: 
!d. 
(a) Whoever -
in interstate or foreign communications -
* * * (B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly -
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and 
(ii) initiates the transmission of, 
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication 
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication 
is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communica-
tion placed the call or initiated the communication; 
* * * * (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be 
used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used 
for such activity, 
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
118. Reno, 512 U.S. at 859. Appellees did "not challenge the application of the stat-
ute to obscene speech," which, the Court noted, is subject to absolute ban. ld. at 833. 
Thus, the Court severed the "or indecent" portion of the statute from the prohibition on 
"obscene" communications. 
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person under eighteen years of age. 119 The statute did not define 
which "community standards" - whether of the local community, 
some broader "community" of Internet users, or some other national 
standard - would be applied in determining whether speech was con-
sidered "patently offensive."120 Violation of this provision also carried 
criminal penalties. 
The CDA provisions applied broadly to the entire universe of 
cyberspace, including e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, chat rooms, 
and the World Wide Web. They were qualified, however, by two af-
firmative defenses.121 The first defense was broadly worded; it al-
lowed those who took "good faith, reasonable, effective, and 
appropriate actions" that were "feasible under available technology" to 
restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications to escape 
conviction.122 The second defense specifically covered those who re-
stricted access to "indecent" or "patently offensive" material by requir-
ing certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card 




(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly -
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons 
under 18 years of age, or 
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a 
person under 18 years of age, 
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication 
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured 
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or or-
gans, regardless of whether the user or such service placed the call or initiated 
the communication; or 
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's 
control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent 
that it be used for such activity, 
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 
120. Reno, 521 U.S. at 873-74. The phrase "patently offensive" was "qualified only 
to the extent that it involve(d] 'sexual or excretory activities or organs' taken 'in context' 
and 'measured by contemporary community standards.'" See id. at 874 n.35; COPA (to 
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(1)(B)). 
121. The defenses, set forth in section 223(e)(5) of COPA provide in full: 
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) of this sec-
tion, or under subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to the use of a facil-
ity for an activity under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section that a person-
(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions 
under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communi-
cation specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate meas-
ures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method which 
is feasible under available technology; or 
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified 
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification 
number. 
COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)). 
122. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A)). 
1999] THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT 1165 
or an adult identification number or code. 123 Persons utilizing one or 
more of these forms of identification also would escape conviction 
under the CDA.124 
B. STRICT ScRUTINY FoR INTERNET SPEECH RESTRICTIONS 
Fifty years ago, Justice Robert H. Jackson recognized that "[t]he 
moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the 
sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, val-
ues, abuses and dangers. Each ... is a law unto itself."125 The 
Supreme Court has long employed differential treatment of the mass 
media under the First Amendment, adjusting the level of scrutiny to 
suit the special features of the medium under consideration.126 
Applying this medium-specific approach, the Reno Court had little 
difficulty settling on strict scrutiny for the CDA, which requires that 
speech restrictions be justified by "compelling" governmental interests 
and "narrowly tailored" to effectuate those interests.127 Reviewing its 
precedents involving other media, the Court concluded that the 
unique factors that had led it on occasion to qualify the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny - including a history of government regula-
tion,128 scarcity of available frequencies at inception,129 and the inva-
sive nature of the media130 - are not present in cyberspace.131 The 
Internet, the Court noted, has never been regulated, has no scarcity of 
outlets for speech, and is a user-driven medium of expression that re-
quires users to take several affirmative steps before content appears 
on a computer screen.132 The Court recognized that the Internet had 
123. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B)). 
124. Reno, 521 U.S. at 881. 
125. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
126. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637, 661-64 (1994) ("it 
is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers 
than of speakers in other media."); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748 ("We have long 
recognized that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment 
problems."). 
The Court has established different rules for print (Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)), broadcast radio and television (Red Lion Broad. Co. v. 
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)), cable television (Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 661-62), bill-
boards (Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (plurality opin-
ion)), and drive-in movie theaters (Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206 
(1975)). 
127. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868; Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 641-42; Simon & Schuster, 
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991). 
128. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (citing Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. ·at 399-400). 
129. ld. (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 637-38). 
130. Id. (citing Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 128). 
131. Id. at 868. 
132. Id. at 854, 868-69. 
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become a powerful new "marketplace of ideas" that was dramatically 
expanding in the absence of government regulation. 133 
The Court also was plainly disturbed by the breadth and unprece-
dented nature of the CDA's speech restrictions.134 The Court noted 
that the CDA's scope was not limited to "commercial speech or com-
mercial entities."135 The Court rejected the Government's argument 
that the CDA was a constitutional form of "cyberzoning" on the In-
ternet, similar to government efforts in real space to isolate and dis-
perse adult establishments, 136 noting that the CDA applied broadly to 
communications made in any of the "vast democratic forums of the 
lnternet."137 In addition, the Court distinguished the CDA from ef-
forts in real space to use zoning laws to disperse or concentrate adult 
establishments on the ground that, unlike real space zoning laws, 
which seek to ameliorate the secondary effects associated with the pro-
scribed speech, the CDA was designed to protect children from the pri-
mary effects of "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech.138 The 
Court characterized the CDA as "a content-based blanket restriction 
on speech," and not a mere time, place, and manner regulation.139 
Thus, the Court determined that its precedents applying lesser scru-
tiny to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions140 did not pro-
vide any basis for applying less demanding scrutiny to the CDA's 
provisions. 
C. TECHNOLOGY, TAILORING, AND OVERBREADTH 
Applying strict scrutiny, the Reno Court held that the CDA's 
prohibitions on "patently offensive" and "indecent" Internet communi-
cations were not narrowly tailored and were unconstitutionally over-
broad.141 The Court recognized, as it had many times in the past, that 
the government's interest in protecting children from harmful speech 
133. Id. at 868-69, 885. 
134. ld. at 887. 
135. ld. 
136. ld. at 867-68. 
137. Id. at 686-69. 
138. Id. at 867-68 (emphasis added); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41, 49 (1986) (discussing secondary effects of adult movie theaters). 
139. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868. 
140. I d. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) ("A restriction that regulates only the time, place, or 
manner of speech may be imposed so long as it is reasonable."). 
141. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868. Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a 
law must be struck down if it would "penalize a substantial amount of speech that is 
constitutionally protected ... even if some applications would be constitutionally unob-
jectionable." Forsyth County Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992). 
The doctrine of substantial overbreadth arose to permit facial challenges to laws that 
might have some permissible applications but that threaten a substantial quantity of 
constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 
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is a compelling one.142 However, the Court explained, the govern-
ment's interest in protecting children "does not justify an unnecessa-
rily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults."143 As the Court 
has explained in several cases involving speech restrictions in other 
media contexts, most recently with regard to proposed regulations of 
cable television content, "the Government may not 'reduc[e] the adult 
population ... to ... only what is fit for children."'144 
The Court's conclusion that the CDA would result in an unneces-
sarily broad suppression of protected speech was based primarily upon 
the findings of the district court concerning the current state of cyber-
space technology, as described in Part II of this article.145 The Court 
relied upon the district court's conclusion that current software tech-
nology does not provide an effective means by which to determine the 
age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, 
newsgroups, or chat rooms.146 The Court also observed that, as a 
practical matter, "it would be prohibitively expensive for noncommer-
cial- as well as some commercial- speakers who have Web sites to 
verify that their users are adults."147 Thus, the Court concluded that 
the CDA was not narrowly tailored, because "existing technology did 
not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from 
obtaining access to communications on the Internet without also deny-
ing access to adults."148 Further, the Court was not convinced that a 
broad government-mandated curtailment of speech was necessary or 
desirable given the variety of more narrowly tailored and currently 
available user-based software applications that enable parents to pre-
vent their children from accessing materials on the Internet that they 
believe are inappropriate.149 
The Court also determined that, given the amount of constitution-
ally protected speech that would fall within the CDA's "patently offen-
sive" and "indecent" categories, the CDA was unconstitutionally 
overbroad. The government sought refuge from the CDA's over-
491, 504 (1985). The doctrine has been applied in particular where the law regulating 
speech is criminal in nature. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987). 
142. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875. As the Court stated in New York v. Ferber: "It is 
evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the phys-
ical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling." New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 
607 (1982)). 
143. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875. 
144. Id. (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 759 (1996) (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 128)). 
145. Id. at 874-77; see supra notes 28-106 and accompanying text. 
146. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876. 
147. Id. at 876-77. 
148. ld. at 876, 879. 
149. ld. at 877-79; supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
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breadth problems in the statute's affirmative defenses.150 It urged the 
Court to hold that "tagging," for example, was a "good faith, reason-
able, effective, and appropriate" action that would provide an affirma-
tive defense to conviction under the CDA.151 However, the Supreme 
Court disagreed that the tagging proposal would, or even could, be 
"effective" given the current state of technology.152 The Court noted 
the government's acknowledgment that the screening software neces-
sary to utilize tagging does not yet exist. 153 Even if such technology 
were available, the Court concluded that there is no way to ensure 
that a recipient of information would be using it.154 Thus, the infor-
mation provider could not rely upon its tagging to be "effective."155 
Similarly, the Court concluded that the affirmative defenses 
based upon restricting access to materials by means of verified credit 
cards or adult passwords did not significantly limit the scope of the 
CDA's speech restrictions.156 The Court acknowledged that such ver-
ification methods were actually used by some "commercial providers of 
sexually explicit material," and that these providers would receive the 
benefit of an affirmative defense.157 However, the Court cited the dis-
trict court's finding that "noncommercial speakers" could not avail 
themselves of this defense, because it was not economically feasible 
for most of them to do so.158 Even with respect to "commercial" speak-
ers, the Court noted that the government had presented no evidence 
that currently available verification methods actually would preclude 
minors from accessing the prohibited speech.159 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that currently available software 
technology could not bear the weight the government placed upon it. 
The technological void led the Court to determine that the CDA swept 
broadly while allowing Internet speakers little or no chance to comply 
with its mandates.16° Further, the Court was not willing to rely upon 
the government's optimistic prediction that future technological ad-
vances would provide meaningful defenses to the CDA's prohibitions, 
which carried severe criminal penalties.161 In the end, the Court held 
that the speech restrictions in the CDA were so broad, and would re-






156. Id. at 881-82. 
157. Id. at 881. 
158. ld. 
159. Id. at 882. 
160. Id. at 878-82. 
161. Id. at 881-82. 
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quire that so much permissible speech be restricted, that they 
amounted to "'burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.'"162 Indeed, the 
Court observed, the CDA was far more dangerous to free speech than 
other speech-restrictive statutes the Court had invalidated - it 
"threaten[ed] to torch a large segment of the Internet community."163 
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, au-
thored an opinion to explain that she viewed the CDA as "little more 
than an attempt by Congress to create 'adult zones' on the In-
temet."164 She rejected the CDA, because it strayed "from the 
blueprint our prior cases have developed for constructing a 'zoning 
law' that passes constitutional muster."165 Specifically, Justice 
O'Connor noted that the Court had previously upheld zoning laws: (1) 
if they did not unduly restrict adult access to constitutionally pro-
tected material, and (2) so long as minors have no First Amendment 
right to view the prohibited material.166 She agreed with the majority 
that technological limitations, as they existed in 1997, caused the 
CDA to fail the first of these limiting principles.167 
D. DISTINGUISHING REAL SPACE PRECEDENTS 
The Court readily distinguished the CDA provisions from speech 
restrictions it had held were permissible in real space. As I will ex-
plain in Part IV, in drafting COPA Congress erred by reading these 
distinctions too literally, while it ignored the more general reserva-
tions articulated by the Court with respect to regulation of Internet 
speech.168 
In Ginsberg v. New York/69 the Court upheld a New York statute 
that prohibited the sale to minors under seventeen years of age of 
materials deemed obscene as to such minors even if the same materi-
als were not obscene as to adults.170 Ginsberg, the proprietor of a 
lunch counter where certain magazines were also sold, was prosecuted 
162. ld. at 882 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127). 
163. ld. 
164. Id. at 886 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
165. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
166. Id. at 888 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
167. Id. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
168. See infra notes 218-55 and accompanying text. 
169. 390 u.s. 629 (1968). 
170. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633, 648 (1968). The Court explained in 
Ginsberg that material is obscene as to minors if it: (1) is "patently offensive to prevail-
ing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable mate-
rial for minors;" (2) appeals to the prurient interest of minors; and (3) is "utterly without 
redeeming social importance for minors." Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633 (citations omitted). 
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after he sold several "girlie" magazines to a sixteen-year-old 
customer. 171 
The Reno Court distinguished the statute upheld in Ginsberg 
from the CDA on four separate grounds. 172 First, the Court noted 
that the New York statute, unlike the CDA, did not prohibit parents 
from purchasing obscene materials for their children should they wish 
to do soP3 This aspect of the New York law was consistent with the 
respect the Court has long afforded the principle that "the parents' 
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their 
children is basic in the structure of our society ."17 4 Second, the Court 
noted that "the New York statute applied only to commercial transac-
tions," while the CDA reached all communications within the prohib-
ited categories transmitted on the Internet.175 Third, unlike the CDA, 
the New York ban on obscene material was limited to material that 
was "utterly without redeeming social importance for minors."176 
Fourth, the Court noted that the New York statute was somewhat 
more narrow in scope than the CDA, in that it defined a minor as a 
person not yet seventeen years old, whereas the CDA included all 
those who were under eighteen years of age.177 
Justice O'Connor's critique of the CDA was somewhat different. 
She distinguished the statute at issue in Ginsberg from the CDA on 
the ground that the former "operated in the physical world, a world 
with two characteristics that make it possible to create 'adult zones: 
geography and identity.'"178 Thus, while the Ginsberg Court could 
simply assume that the adult zone created by the New York statute 
"would succeed in preserving adults' access while denying minors' ac-
cess to the regulated speech," the Court could not make such an as-
171. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631. The New York statute provided that it was an af-
firmative defense that (a) the defendant "had reasonable cause to believe that the minor 
involved was seventeen years or more;" and (b) such minor "exhibited to the defendant a 
draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official docu-
ment purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years old or more." N.Y. 
PENAL LAw§ 484-h (McKinney 1909). Ginsberg apparently did not assert that the af-
firmative defenses applied in his case. Thus, the Court had no occasion to comment on 
them. 
172. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865. 
173. Id. 
174. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first 
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations 
the state can neither supply nor hinder."). 
175. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865. 
176. ld. (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646). 
177. Id. at 865-66. 
178. Id. at 889 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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sumption with respect to the CDA, which operated in a world devoid of 
the "twin characteristics" of "geography and identity."179 
The Court also distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 180 in 
which it upheld a declaratory order issued by the FCC that a twelve-
minute "Filthy Words" monologue that repeatedly used "certain words 
referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs" was "indecent" 
and "patently offensive" as broadcast and could be prohibited from ra-
dio airwaves during afternoon hours when children are likely to be in 
the audience. 181 In Reno, the Court distinguished the order upheld in 
Pacifica from the CDA on the ground that the FCC order was "issued 
by an agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades [and] 
targeted a specific broadcast that represented a rather dramatic de-
parture from traditional program content in order to designate when 
-rather than whether- it would be permissible to air such a pro-
gram in that particular medium."182 By contrast, the CDA's prohibi-
tions were not limited to particular times and were not dependent 
upon any evaluation by an agency or other body familiar with the 
unique aspects of the Internet.183 The Court also noted that, unlike 
the CDA, the FCC's order was not punitive in nature. 184 Finally, the 
Court noted that radio had traditionally received the most limited 
First Amendment protection "in large part because warnings could not 
adequately protect the listener from unexpected program content."185 
Relying on the findings of the district court, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the Internet was significantly different from other media 
in this regard. The Court accepted the district court's findings that 
the Internet is not an invasive medium and materials generally do not 
take users by surprise.186 Indeed, the Court noted that the district 
court had found that "the risk of encountering indecent material by 
accident is remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to 
access specific .material. "187 
E. THE VAGUENESS OF THE CDA 
In addition to urging the Court to invalidate the CDA on over-
breadth grounds, the plaintiffs also argued that the CDA was too 
vague to support a criminal prosecution and hence violated the Fifth 
179. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
180. 438 u.s. 726 (1978). 
181. Reno, 521 U.S. at 866 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730, 735 
(1978)). 
182. Id. at 867. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748). 
186. ld. at 867. 
187. Id. 
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Amendment.188 The Court declined to invalidate the CDA on this al-
ternative ground.189 However, it expressed concern that "the many 
ambiguities concerning the scope of [the CDA's] coverage render it 
problematic for purposes of the First Amendment."190 
The Court's concern that the CDA was unconstitutionally vague 
centered upon the amorphous nature of the category of speech the 
CDA purported to prohibit. The Court noted the absence of any defini-
tion for the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive," and the result-
ing confusion concerning how the standards related to each other.191 
In addition, the Court rejected the government's argument that be-
cause the CDA's "patently offensive" provision contained one of the 
prongs set forth in Miller v. California192 - that material be "pa-
tently offensive" as defined by state law - it could not be deemed un-
constitutionally vague. 193 To the contrary, the Court reasoned that 
Miller had added to the "patently offensive" standard a requirement 
that the material at issue be "specifically defined by the applicable 
state law," a requirement that was lacking in the CDA.194 In addi-
tion, the Court stated that the inclusion of one part of the three-prong 
Miller test for obscenity did not necessarily save the CDA.195 The 
Court noted that the two requirements that the government left out of 
the statute - that the material, ta:ken as a whole, appeal to the "pru-
rient interest," and that it lack "serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value" - substantially limited the scope of the obscenity 
definition. 196 
188. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861. The Supreme Court has stated that criminal statutes 
should be construed with utmost care for clarity, because "[n]o one may be required at 
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes, and this 
is particularly true of laws having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech." Hynes v. 
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (quoting, in part, Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959)). 
189. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864. 
190. Id. at 870. 
191. ld. at 871. 
192. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the Court established the following test for deter-
mining whether material is obscene: 
(a) whether the average person applying contemporary community standards 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, 
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Reno, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)). 
193. Reno, 521 U.S. at 872-73. 
194. ld. at 873 (citations omitted). 
195. ld. 
196. ld. 
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IV. ROUND II: THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT OF 
1998 ("COPA") 
It did not take Congress long after the Supreme Court invalidated 
the CDA to enact its second content-based restriction on Internet 
speech. Despite the serious reservations of his own Department of 
Justice,197 President Clinton signed COPA into law on October 21, 
1998, approximately fourteen months after the Supreme Court's Reno 
decision. As with the CDA, it did not take the courts long to block 
Congress's latest effort to construct a speech zone on the Internet. On 
February 1, 1999, a federal district court in Pennsylvania prelimina-
rily enjoined enforcement of COPA pending .a trial on the merits.198 
The speed with which Congress acted in passing COPA prevented 
it from deliberating at length the merits ·of its second Internet zoning 
project. As a result, COPA has a legislative pedigree only slightly 
more impressive than that of the CDA. Like the CDA, COPA was ap-
pended to a far more substantial legislative enactment; the law was 
tucked into the 5000-plus page Omnibus Budget Bill of 1998. Perhaps 
sensing the Supreme Court's frustration with the apparent lack of 
forethought that preceded passage of the CDA, Congress held two 
hearings prior to passing COPA that addressed the ease with which 
children can access pornography on the Internet and the need for a 
congressional response to this problem.199 
197. In a letter dated October 5, 1998, addressed to Representative Thomas Bliley, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Commerce, the Justice Department set forth its 
views concerning COP A. See 144 Cong. Rec. S12796-98 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (letter 
from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General). In the letter, the Depart-
ment expressed several concerns. First, the Department worried that COPA "could re-
quire an undesirable diversion of critical investigative and prosecutorial resources that 
the Department currently invests in combating traffickers in hard-core child pornogra-
phy, in thwarting child predators, and in prosecuting large-scale and multidistrict com-
mercial distributors of obscene materials." ld. at S12796. Second, the Department 
expressed doubt as to whether COPA "would have a material effect in limiting minors' 
access to harmful materials," because the thousands ofnewsgroups and other Internet 
fora on which children can access pornography as well as overseas Web sites would not 
be affected by the law. I d. Third, the Department warned that COPA might not survive 
strict scrutiny, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of the CDA in 
Reno. Id. at S12797. Fourth, and finally, the Department opined that COPA "contains 
numerous ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage." I d. 
198. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
199. Hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation on February 10, 1998, and by the Subcommittee on Telecommunica-
tions, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the House Committee on Commerce on Sep-
tember 11, 1998. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 20 (1998). In the latter hearing, 
Congress received testimony from, among others, a representative of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation, the executive director of the Free Speech Coalition, representa-
tives of various Internet security organizations, Professor Larry Lessig of Harvard Law 
School, and a professor of psychology. 
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A. THE COPA WEB ZONE 
The Reno Court held that Congress had overreached with the 
CDA primarily because the statute's speech restrictions threatened a 
substantial portion of the Internet community with criminal prosecu-
tion.200 In COPA, Congress sought to construct a narrower zone of 
restricted speech. 
COPA's proposed zone is narrower than the CDA in several re-
spects. It extends only to certain types of speech made on the World 
Wide Web, and does not cover the entire Internet, as did the CDA. 
The targeted speech is that which is deemed to include content "harm-
ful to minors" - a phrase defined with specific reference to the Miller 
test. COPA would prohibit Web publishers who seek to make a profit 
from distributing ''harmful" materials on the Web to anyone under age 
seventeen. In order to enforce this prohibition, Congress utilized the 
same approach it had adopted in the CDA- prohibited communica-
tions are subject to heavy civil and criminal penalties, unless a Web 
publisher is protected from conviction by one of the statute's affirma-
tive defenses, which are discussed below in Part IV(A)(2).201 
More specifically, COPA imposes criminal and civil penalties on 
anyone who "knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the 
material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World 
Wide Web, makes any communication for commercial purposes that is 
available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful 
to minors."202 Persons who violate this provision are subject to a fine 
of not more than $50,000 and imprisonment not to exceed six months, 
or both.203 COPA also imposes a further fine of not more than $50,000 
for each "intentional" violation of the above provision.204 For pur-
poses of the proscription on "intentional" violations, each day ofviola-
tion is deemed a separate violation.205 In addition to criminal 
penalties, COPA imposes civil fines of not more than $50,000 for each 
violation, Congress again having provided that each day of violation 
constitutes a separate violation.206 
1. The Boundaries of the Proposed Zone 
COPA contains several definitions that are intended to clarify its 
scope and to alleviate the concerns raised by the Reno Court. The Act 
200. Reno, 521 U.S. at 881-82, 885. 
201. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text. 
202. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)). 
203. Id. 
204. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2)). 
205. ld. 
206. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(2)-(3)). 
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defines a minor as "any person under 17 years of age."207 Material 
that is deemed ''harmful to minors" is defined as follows: 
Any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, arti-
cle, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is ob-
scene or that - (A) the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, would find, taking the material 
as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal 
to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B) de-
picts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive 
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or 
sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted 
sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubes-
cent female breast; and (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.2os 
Under COPA, a person can be penalized for distributing such ma-
terial "by means of the World Wide Web," which is in turn defined as 
"by placement of material in a computer server-based file archive so 
that it is publicly accessible, over the Internet, using hypertext trans-
fer protocol or any successor protocol."209 COPA seeks to punish only 
those who make such communications on the Web for "commercial 
purposes," which means that only those who are "engaged in the busi-
ness of making such communications"210 are covered by the Act. 
COP A's definition of "engaged in the business" is broad. It means: 
that the person who makes a communication, or offers to 
make a communication, by means of the World Wide Web, 
that includes any material that is harmful to minors devotes 
time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course 
of such person's trade or business, with the objective of earn-
ing a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not 
necessary that the person make a profit or that the making or 
offering to make such communications be the person's sole or 
principal business or source of income). 211 
Under COPA, a person is deemed to be "engaged in the business" 
of making the proscribed communications if "the person knowingly 
causes the material that is harmful to minors to be posted on the 
World Wide Web or knowingly solicits such material to be posted on 
the World Wide Web."212 The Act exempts certain persons from liabil-
ity, including Internet Service Providers and Web browser services.213 
207. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(7)). 
208. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)) (emphasis added). 
209. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(l)). 
210. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A)). 
211. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)) (emphasis added). 
212. ld. 
213. Section 231(b) of the Act provides that a person shall not be considered to make 
any communication for commercial purposes to the extent that such person is: 
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2. Affirmative Defenses to Conviction 
Like the CDA, COPA contains several provisions that purport to 
allow a defendant to assert affirmative defenses in prosecutions for 
communicating material that is "harmful to minors" on the Web. 
These defenses would not, of course, prevent the government from 
bringing a prosecution under COPA. They would simply provide de-
fenses that, if proven by a defendant, would allow him or her to escape 
conviction. 
COPA sets forth three affirmative defenses that are available to a 
person who, "in good faith, has restricted access by minors to material 
that is harmful to minors."2 14 First, a defendant may escape convic-
tion "by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, 
or adult personal identification number."215 Second, persons who "ac-
cept[] a digital certificate that verifies age" are allowed an affirmative 
defense to conviction.216 Third, COPA provides an affirmative defense 
to anyone who restricts access by minors to ''harmful" material "by 
any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available 
technology."217 
B. THE CoNSTITUTIONALITY oF COPA 
The Reno decision caused Congress to improve upon the CDA, but 
none of the alterations it made in COPA cure the problems that 
doomed Congress' first effort to construct a child-free zone on the In-
ternet. Congress has again failed to appreciate the limitations upon 
government regulation posed by the unique architecture of the In-
ternet. More fundamentally, Congress erred in reading the Reno deci-
sion as an invitation to draft a second Internet speech law rather than 
a signal from the Supreme Court that the medium, and the technology 
that is to be applied to it, should be permitted some period of unregu-
(1) a telecommunications carrier engaged in the provision of a telecommunica-
tions service; (2) a person engaged in the business of providing an Internet 
access, service; (3) a person engaged in the business of providing an Internet 
information location tool; or (4) similarly engaged in the transmission, storage, 
retrieval, hosting, formatting, or translation (or any combination thereoO of a 
communication made by another person, without selection or alteration of the 
content of the communication, except that such person's deletion of a particular 
communication or material made by another person in a manner consistent 
with subsection (c) or section 230 shall not constitute such selection or altera-
tion of the content of the communication. 
ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(b)). "Internet," "Internet Access Service," and "In-
ternet Information Location Tool" are defined elsewhere in the Act. See id. (to be codi-
fied at 4 7 U.S.C. § 231(e)(3)-(5)). 
214. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)). 
215. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A)). 
216. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(B)). 
217. ld. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(l)(C)). 
1999] THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT 1177 
lated development. In addition, while COPA addresses some of the 
vagueness problems that doomed the CDA, the statute presents its 
own troublesome ambiguities. 
1. Responding to Reno 
In enacting COPA, Congress sought in several respects to respond 
principally to the Reno Court's holdings that the CDA was not nar-
rowly tailored to serve the government's compelling interest in pro-
tecting children and was unconstitutionally overbroad. It began with 
the geographical scope of the law. Congress limited the breadth of 
COPA by applying its prohibition only to materials posted on the Web. 
Unlike the CDA, COPA does not appear to apply to content distrib-
uted through other aspects of the Internet, such as e-mail and 
newsgroups. 218 
Responding to the Reno Court's criticism that the CDA applied to 
commercial and non-commercial speakers alike, 219 Congress at-
tempted in COPA to regulate only harmful communications that are 
made "for commercial purposes." According to the legislative history, 
Congress did not believe that COPA would prohibit or have any effect 
upon non-commercial activities on the Web.22° Congress also believed 
that the commercial entities it sought to regulate are currently able to 
verify the age of users through verified credit cards or other means.221 
Congress also sought to narrow the scope and effect of COPA by 
purporting to regulate only a particular category of non-obscene 
speech - speech ''harmful to minors" - that is arguably narrower 
than the "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech it sought to regu-
late under the CDA. In formulating this standard, Congress also re-
sponded to the Reno Court's concern that the "patently offensive" and 
218. COPA applies to written communications and, as noted in Part II, e-mail and 
chat rooms constitute a portion of the Web's geography. See supra notes 66-69 and ac-
companying text. Thus, it is not altogether certain that one who publishes material 
that is "harmful to minors" via e-mail would not be subject to prosecution under the Act. 
Of course, the person would escape conviction if he were not "engaged in the business" of 
making communications that include material that is ''harmful to minors." 
219. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877 (stating that the "breadth of the CDA's coverage is 
wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the 
scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its open-
ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent 
messages or displaying them ... in the presence of minors"). 
220. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 7 (1998) ("[COPA) does not prohibit non-commer-
cial activities over the Web, or over the Internet for that matter, and thus the concerns 
raised by the Supreme Court are no longer applicable."); Id. at 8 (stating COPA "does 
not affect noncommercial speech"). 
221. See H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 8 ("[COPA) provides a legitimate defense for 
commercial purveyors of pornography."); Id. at 10 (noting that COPA provides Web pub-
lishers with "a host of good faith defenses from prosecution if they adopt reasonable 
measures to restrict a minor's access to material that is harmful"). 
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"indecent" language that was used in the CDA was too vague to place 
speakers on notice of what speech was prohibited.222 Material that is 
"harmful to minors"223 is defined by incorporating the Miller obscenity 
test, as modified by the Supreme Court's holdings in Ginsberg v. New 
York224 and other cases, that minors may be denied access to speech 
that is constitutionally protected as to adults. 
Finally, Congress sought to alleviate the Supreme Court's concern 
that the CDA denied parents the right to maintain ultimate control in 
rearing their children.225 Under the CDA, a parent who purchased 
"indecent" or "patently offensive" materials for a child would be sub-
ject to the Act's penalties.226 Unlike the CDA, COPA does not prohibit 
parents from purchasing material deemed ''harmful to minors" for 
their children who are under the age of seventeen. 
2. High Hurdles for Internet Speech Restrictions 
While Congress altered COPA in various respects to meet the 
Reno Court's criticisms, it did not abandon the fundamental approach 
to Internet speech regulation that it adopted in the CDA. Like the 
CDA, COPA is a criminal statute, which poses a very strong risk that 
speakers will remain silent rather than post words, images, or ideas 
on the Web that might fall within COP A's restrictions.227 Neither the 
regulatory landscape nor the medium has changed in any significant 
respect since the CDA was invalidated. COPA, like the CDA, and un-
like the FCC order upheld in Pacifica, is an attempt to regulate a new 
communications medium that has no history of government regula-
tion, has low access barriers, and is not characterized by the invasive 
nature of its content.22s 
Like its predecessor, COPA is a content-based regulation of con-
stitutionally protected speech. As such, COPA will be treated by the 
courts as presumptively invalid. This presumption of invalidity is es-
pecially difficult to overcome in COPA's case, as COPA criminalizes 
material that is constitutionally protected for adults. Although 
COPA's "harmful to minors" standard is arguably narrower than the 
categories of "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech regulated by 
the CDA, there is no doubt that like the restrictions in the CDA, 
COPA limits speech that is constitutionally protected as to adults. 
222. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870-74. 
223. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
224. 390 u.s. 629 (1968). 
225. Reno, 521 U.S. at 865. 
226. Id. 
227. ld. at 872. 
228. Id. at 868 (citing Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 637-38; Sable Communications, 
492 U.S. at 128; Red Lion Broad., 395 U.S. at 366). 
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COPA's prohibition on material that is "harmful to minors" ap-
plies to any "communication, picture, image, graphic image file, arti-
cle, recording, writing, or other matter" that meets the ''harmful to 
minors" standard.229 Material is "harmful to minors" if it: (1) "with 
respect to minors, is designed to appeal to ... the prurient interest;" 
(2) is "patently offensive with respect to minors;" and (3) "lack[s] seri-
ous ... value for minors."230 Thus, the definition of ''harmful to mi-
nors" expressly requires that the speaker take into account the impact 
of the speech on minors, not on adults. There is a large category of 
speech, for example, that is not "patently offensive" for adults to com-
municate and receive, and that has value when communicated to 
adults, but that many communities may believe is offensive and lacks 
value for communication to minors. Further, Congress substantially 
expanded the category of proscribed speech by failing to distinguish 
between material that lacks value for a sixteen-year-old and material 
that lacks value for a younger child. Under COPA, speakers are at 
risk if they communicate material that could be deemed harmful to an 
eight-year-old user. 
Given these similarities to the CDA, there is no reason to believe 
that courts will treat COPA any differently by implementing a stan-
dard of review less onerous than strict scrutiny.231 Thus, COPA will 
stand only if it is justified by a compelling governmental interest and 
is "narrowly tailored" to effectuate that interest.232 
3. The (Over) Breadth of the COPA Zone 
It will not be difficult for the government to satisfy the "compel-
ling interest" prong of strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court ac-
cepted in Reno, as it had on many prior occasions, that the 
government's interest in protecting at least younger children from 
harmful materials they may encounter on the Internet is a compelling 
229. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)). 
230. See id. 
231. The district court that granted a temporary restraining order against enforce-
ment of COPA assumed that strict scrutiny should be applied to COP A. See ACLU v. 
Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1998) (on file with author). See also Reno, 521 U.S. 
at 868, 870 (concluding that case law provided "no basis for qualifying the level of First 
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium"). The government may 
argue that COPA, which on its face seeks to prohibit only speech made "for commercial 
purposes," is a regulation of so-called "commercial speech," and therefore should be sub-
jected to lesser First Amendment scrutiny. Even assuming that the government could 
demonstrate that COPA narrowly targets so-called "commercial speech," under the 
Supreme Court's precedents the level of scrutiny does not depend so much upon the 
nature of the speech as upon the nature of the medium of expression. See id. at 868, 
870. Because COPA is a content-based restriction of speech on the Internet, it should be 
subjected to the most exacting judicial scrutiny. 
232. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
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one.233 Thus, as with the CDA, parties litigating the constitutionality 
of COPA will join issue at the point where the courts must determine 
whether the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve Congress' compel-
ling objective.234 
Congress' effort to build an "adults only" zone on the Web that 
resembles a real-space zone encounters two related, fundamental 
flaws in cyberspace. The first problem is that regardless of Congress' 
intent, COP A's definition of Web speech made "for commercial pur-
poses" will have a substantial effect on speech communicated over the 
Web for free. The second problem, which is related to the first, is that 
while all of the changes to the statutory language noted above repre-
sent modest improvements over the CDA, none successfully addresses 
the fundamental difficulties that the absence of geography and iden-
tity on the Internet pose for the regulation of cyber-speech. Despite 
the Reno Court's strong message that the technology does not yet exist 
to support the type of affirmative defenses Congress would subse-
quently incorporate into COPA, Congress nonetheless proceeded on 
the assumption that these affirmative defenses would be widely avail-
able to protect the targeted "commercial" speakers from conviction.235 
As I will demonstrate, however, Congress' mis-interpretations of 
COPA's breadth and effect were errors of constitutional dimension. 
COPA's ultimate effect will be to silence a substantial number of 
speakers, who will be unable to find cover in the statute's affirmative 
defenses and therefore will be forced to resort to self-censorship. 
a. The Intractable Overbreadth Problem 
As the district court observed in Reno, the content of speech on 
the Web, which is provided by millions of users worldwide, "is as di-
verse as human thought."236 It ranges from art, to humor, to litera-
ture, to medical information, to music, to news, to sexually oriented 
material. For example, on the Web one can view the full text of the 
Bible, read the New York Times, or browse through paintings from art 
galleries around the world. 
Congress's apparent intent was to apply COPA's speech restric-
tions narrowly to only those online vendors who sell pornographic 
233. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) ("It 
is evident beyond the need for elaboration that the State's interest in safeguarding the 
physical and psychological well-being of a 'minor' is 'compelling.'") (quoting Globe News-
paper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
234. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (noting that government may effectuate even a com-
pelling interest only "by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests 
without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms"). 
235. Reno, 521 U.S. at 881-82. 
236. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
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materials "for commercial purposes." If that was the intent, however, 
Congress failed to effectuate it in the text of the statute itself. In-
stead, Congress drafted the statute in such a way as to cover all per-
sons who make "any communication for commercial purposes that is 
available to any minor and that includes any material that is harmful 
to minors."237 Under the plain language of COPA, a speaker is sub-
jected to civil and criminal penalties if, as a regular course of business, 
he communicates any material for commercial purposes on the Web 
that includes any material - even a single description or photograph 
-that is harmful to minors. In addition, Congress forbade in COPA 
the transmission of purely ''written" materials that are "harmful to 
minors."238 If its intent was to target commercial pornographers, 
Congress failed to draft a statute to effectuate this intent. 
In any event, Congress wrote the commercial/non-commercial di-
chotomy into COPA as a direct response to the Supreme Court's state-
ment in Reno that the CDA was overbroad because it applied to "non-
commercial" as well as "commercial" speakers.239 The Court found 
this distinction relevant, in part, because financial costs and burdens 
are a relevant consideration in determining whether a speech-restnc-
tive law uses the least restrictive means to prohibit the targeted 
speech.240 As the Reno Court noted, the substantial number of pub-
lishers who provide their content on the Internet for free would be 
financially incapable of implementing the technology required under 
the CDA's affirmative defenses, and thus would be subject to criminal 
conviction. 241 
Some purveyors of sexually explicit material charge their users 
for access to their sites by requiring that users "present" a credit card 
before entering. These are apparently the "commercial" speakers Con-
gress sought to target when it drafted COPA, and to whom COPA pro-
vides an affirmative defense to conviction.242 · However, what 
237. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)) (emphasis added). 
238. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)). 
239. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 865. 
240. Id. at 874-79. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) 
(finding unconstitutional deterrent effect on free speech where; to avoid prosecution, 
theater owners were required either to "restrict their movie offerings or [to] construct 
adequate protective fencing which may be extremely expensive or even physically im-
practicable"); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 
502 U.S. 105, 115, 116 (1991) ("A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First 
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their 
speech" because such a regulation "raises the specter that the government may effec-
tively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."). 
241. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77, 881-82. 
242. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)) (declaring that those who sell 
their content on the Web are provided with an affirmative defense when the buyer pays 
by credit or debit card). The government will likely urge the courts to construe COPA so 
as to apply only to the commercial sale of"pornography." However, the "engaged in the 
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Congress (and perhaps the Court243) did not understand is that the 
overwhelming majority of information on the Web is provided for free 
to users by entities who may happen to be communicating on the Web 
"for commercial purposes," as that phrase has been defined by 
Congress. 244 
Like many traditional, real space print newspapers, bookstores, 
and magazine publishers, many Web publishers make a profit, or at-
tempt to make a profit, through advertising. In addition, cyberspace 
content providers such as online booksellers, music stores, and art 
vendors allow potential customers to browse their content for free-
similar to browsing in a real space book store or art gallery. Finally, 
some Web publishers make a profit by charging their content contrib-
utors, although users may access the content on their sites for free. 
Thus, there is a vast amount of information on the Web that is 
provided to users for free by entities who operate "with the objective of 
earning a profit."245 Much of this information, particularly that which 
concerns matters of sexuality, might be deemed ''harmful to minors" in 
some communities. For example, a Web user can access the entire 
Starr Report concerning President Clinton's sexual relationship with 
an intern and any related discussions, explicit safer-sex information, 
pictures by well-known artists such as Robert Mapplethorpe and An-
dres Serrano, and videos about AIDS. So long as the provider of such 
content sought in some manner to make a profit from its Web site, 
COPA would prohibit distribution of this information to adults and 
business" language chosen by Congress, which covers anyone who seeks to make a profit 
(whether successful or not) and devotes "time and attention" to making communications 
that include content that is "harmful to minors," is not "readily susceptible" to such a re-
write and therefore would not warrant such a limited construction. See Reno, 521 U.S. 
at 884 (stating that a court "may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is 
'readily susceptible' to such a construction") (quoting Virginia v. American Booksellers 
Ass'n, Inc. 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). It is "for Congress, not [the courts), to rewrite the 
statute." Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 419 (1971). 
243. The Court in Reno was not confronted with a statute that made any effort to 
distinguish between those who provided content for free and those who sought to make 
a profit from their content. The Court did, however, note that the expense of complying 
with the CDA would have been prohibitive even for some "commercial" content provid-
ers. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77. 
244. COPA does not require that a content provider devote the majority of its time 
or Web site space to speech that is "harmful to minors." A provider is "engaged in the 
business" of making harmful speech so long as he or she "devotes time, attention, or 
labor" to making such speech "as a regular course of such person's trade or business." 
COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)). Nor is it necessary that the informa-
tion provider be profitable in such endeavors. See id. (declaring that for liability to at-
tach, it is "not necessary that the person make a profit"). 
245. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(B)). 
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children alike, unless the publisher is able to take advantage of one of 
COPA's affirmative defenses to conviction.246 
A description of a few of the seventeen plaintiffs in the current 
lawsuit seeking to block COPA from taking effect demonstrates that 
Congress' commercial/non-commercial dichotomy is unworkable in 
cyberspace and encompasses within COP A's prohibitions a wide range 
of speech that does not constitute pornography sold for profit by online 
smut vendors.247 Androgyny Books, d/b/a A Different Light Book-
stores, one of the plaintiffs in the pending lawsuit, maintains a Web 
site through which visitors can purchase books and music of interest 
to gay and lesbian individuals and can receive information about the 
gay and lesbian community, some of which may be deemed ''harmful 
to minors" under COPA. Visitors to this Web site may browse the 
"bookshelves" located on the site for books about gay and lesbian is-
sues or by gay and lesbian authors. In addition, the Web site offers 
book reviews and publishes essays and book excerpts which may con-
tain material that is "harmful to minors." Users may currently visit 
the Androgyny site anonymously and need present a credit card only if 
they wish to make a purchase. 
ArtNet Worldwide Corporation, another plaintiff challenging 
COPA, is the leading vendor of fine art on the Web. The ArtNet site 
allows users to view, free of charge, samples of art available at auc-
tions, fairs, and museum shows. The site also contains postings of in-
dividual artists, who describe their art and exhibit individual works 
for sale. Some of the items displayed on the ArtNet site for free may 
be considered ''harmful to minors." In addition, the ArtNet site con-
tains a magazine providing news articles, editorials, and art criticism 
written by its own correspondents and gathered from external 
sources, as well as chat rooms where users can promote their own art 
and discuss art in general. ArtNet funds its site by selling space on it 
to advertisers and to sellers of art and related items, such as artists 
and galleries. 
Addazi, Inc., d/b/a Condomania, maintains a Web site that focuses 
on assisting customers in learning about and purchasing condoms and 
safer sex products. The site contains an online catalog featuring over 
250 items, the latest safer sex information, regularly updated newslet-
ters and editorials, and company information. It also includes a sev-
enteen-page Condomania Safer Sex Manual, which uses frank 
language to educate and help people understand safer sex issues. 
246. Recall that COPA targets both written and visual expression. See COPA (to be 
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)). 
247. The following descriptions are derived from the Complaint, Reno v. ACLU, No. 
98-5591 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1998) (on file with author). 
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Much of the information provided on the Condomania site may be 
deemed ''harmful to minors." As on the Androgyny and ArtNet sites, 
users access the Condomania site anonymously and are asked to pres-
ent a credit card only at the point where they reach the "checkout" 
portion of the site to make purchases. 
Under COPA, all of the information on these and a host of similar 
sites, regardless of its educational or other value,248 would be unavail-
able to users. As I explain in the next section, most of these vendors, 
like the vendors with whom the Supreme Court was concerned in 
Reno, cannot comply with the requirements of COP A's affirmative de-
fenses and must therefore shut down or face criminal prosecutions 
and heavy fines. Thus, COPA has the effect of censoring the array of 
free content on these sites as a consequence of their "seeking to make 
a profit" from advertising or other sources. 
In choosing to codify the commerciaVnon-commercial dichotomy 
in COPA, Congress has demonstrated the difficulty with transporting 
principles that work well in real space into the realm of cyberspace. 
Few, if any, purveyors of pornography in real space distribute materi-
als free of charge. Indeed, in most cases real space purveyors of porno-
graphic materials exist for only one purpose - to sell pornography for 
profit. As they do not give their products away, we can assume that a 
law aimed at the "sale" of pornography will affect these businesses, 
and only these businesses. The legislature can require, for example, 
that these businesses place sexually explicit ("harmful") images they 
wish to sell to the public behind the counter. 
In cyberspace, however, many Web sites do not exist solely to sell 
the "harmful" materials proscribed by COPA. Their Web sites exist 
for other purposes, such as to educate the public on matters of birth 
control, sexuality, or other topics unsuitable for consumption by chil-
dren. Indeed, they may not sell their content at all, relying instead 
upon advertising revenues to support the distribution of free content. 
Nor can publishers of these Web sites place ''harmful" items (assum-
ing they can be identified with some precision) "behind the counter" 
without depriving adults - and perhaps older children - of constitu-
tionally protected speech. 
There is a significant difference between the impact of speech re-
strictive laws that are aimed at "commercial" speakers in real space 
and the effect similar laws will have on cyber-speakers who "seek to 
make a profit." The architecture of real space allows vendors to dis-
criminate in the distribution of "harmful" material at the point of 
248. The "value to minors" prong ofCOPA's "harmful to minors" definition does not 
exclude material that has "educational" or "medical" value for minors. See COPA (to be 
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)). 
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purchase.249 Stated somewhat differently: "porn in real space regu-
lates itself."250 Adults and children alike can generally browse the. 
aisles of a real space bookstore, with adults, but not children, being 
permitted to purchase certain materials.251 Porn in cyberspace does 
not self-regulate. Because cyberspace, as it now exists, allows every-
one to travel and browse anonymously, one can browse the wares of a 
site without anyone even knowing you were in the store. The only 
fool-proof way to ensure that minors are not browsing is to deny access 
to adults as well. 
The statute upheld in Ginsberg v. New York,252 for example, pro-
hibited the direct commercial sale of ''harmful" magazines to minors, 
but did not ban any communications between adults. 253 Indeed, the 
Ginsberg Court noted that the statute was valid because it "does not 
bar the appellant from stocking the magazines and selling them" to 
adults.254 The New York Legislature was reasonably confident that 
proprietors could distinguish between children and adults at the point 
of sale of "harmful" materials. COPA, by contrast, would prohibit the 
communication of information and ideas before any sale was even con-
templated. It would require that proprietors of all establishments, 
whether or not of an "adult" variety, prohibit anyone from so much as 
entering their establishments without first presenting identification 
proving that they were seventeen years of age or older. COPA would, 
in effect, prohibit the practice of browsing free content, which is one of 
the unique characteristics of Web surfing. 
In sum, Web speech, at least as it is currently communicated, 
does not permit Congress to regulate "commercial" speech without 
also substantially suppressing materials that are distributed without 
charge. Like the CDA, COPA fails to distinguish between commercial 
entities that actually sell information or products over the Internet 
and businesses that disseminate free information about their services 
or products. The Internet has allowed many small businesses to pros-
per precisely because they can provide information about their serv-
249. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 
886 (1996). 
250. Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 886. It does so, as Professor Lessig points out, 
"through social structures and social norms, some actively construed, others evolution-
ary, that channel porn in real space to a particular place in real space, and discriminate 
with some effectiveness in its distribution in that real space." Id. at 885-86. 
251. Again, given the architectural attributes of real space, it may be possible to 
shield children from browsing certain materials while allowing adults to freely do so, 
such as by creating a separate room for adult-oriented materials. The architecture of 
cyberspace does not allow such discrimination; once a user accesses a Web site, he or 
she cannot be prohibited from any portion of the site. 
252. 390 u.s. 629 (1968). 
253. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631, 634-35 (1968). 
254. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634-35. 
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ices at little or no cost to users. COPA would destroy these low entry 
barriers, thus silencing many speakers and reducing the breadth of 
diversity and information on the Internet, by forcing speakers like the 
New York Times, NetArt, and others to charge for all of their speech. 
COPA does nothing to assuage the concern articulated by the 
Supreme Court in Reno that Congress is threatening to punish a sub-
stantial number of publishers who distribute information on the Web 
for free. 255 
b. State-of-the-Art Meets State of the Law 
As it did with the CDA, the government will again attempt to 
limit the potential breadth and effect of its new speech-restrictive leg-
islation by resorting to the Act's affirmative defenses. Reno demon-
strated, however, that the government's power to regulate Internet 
speech is contingent upon the widespread availability of technology 
capable of effecting the architectural changes necessary for constitu-
tionally precise discrimination in the access to and distribution of 
"harmful" materials on the Web. 256 As Professor Lessig has stated: 
If it is extremely cheap perfectly to discriminate in who hears 
what, then there will be no constitutional problem with a reg-
ulation that requires perfect discrimination. The Constitu-
tion kicks in only when the technologies are not so perfect: 
When to comply with a legitimate objective (to protect chil-
dren), one must sacrifice interests not within the objective (to 
make smut available to adults). In those cases, Congress's 
power to protect children is limited by the First Amendment 
rights of the adults.257 
The technology, as it currently exists, does not facilitate the regulation 
that COPA mandates. Congress, in other words, has once again failed 
to respect the current technological limitations on zoning speech on 
the Web. When combined with the unworkable commercial/non-com-
mercial dichotomy in COPA, this technological gap lays bare Con-
gress's inability to grapple with the Internet's pornography problem 
without suppressing a substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected communication. 
COPA applies to all communications on the Web that are "avail-
able to any minor."258 As the Reno Court noted, "existing technology 
[does] not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors 
from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without 
255. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-79. 
256. ld. at 881-82. 
257. Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 885. 
258. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)). 
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also denying access to adults."259 Currently available technology, 
which was discussed in Part II, 260 provides no reasonable means for 
speakers to make their speech "available" only to adults. Engineers 
continue to develop "tagging," rating, and DNS technology, but the 
prerequisites for establishing effective adults-only zones based on this 
technology do not yet exist. There is still no widespread agreement on 
how to "rate" or "tag" Web content, and relatively few Web publishers 
are employing these largely experimental methods. In addition, the 
user-based software necessary to ensure that children are denied ac-
cess to the tagged or rated content has not yet been developed. From 
the perspective of Web speakers, the information that they make 
available on the public spaces of the Web must be made available 
either to all users of the Web, including users.who may be minors, or 
not at all. 
One of COP A's defenses applies if a defendant restricts access by 
"requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code,• or 
adult personal identification number."261 As noted in Part II, a de-
fense based upon credit card verification is unavailable to the millions 
of Web speakers who publish through commercial online services such 
as America Online and Prodigy Internet, because there is no technol-
ogy that would enable credit card verification by those speakers. 262 
Further, the credit card defense is effectively unavailable to providers 
of free content because, again as noted in Part II, financial institutions 
charge to verify a credit card. 263 The cost of credit card verification 
will impose devastating economic burdens on speakers and other con-
tent providers who want to provide their speech for free.264 If speak-
ers absorbed the costs of credit card verification themselves, rather 
than passing them along to users, some speakers with controversial 
content would risk economic sabotage - users who disapproved of 
their speech could simply access their site again and again in order to 
drive up the cost of verification. The courts have routinely struck 
down such economic burdens on the exercise of protected speech.265 
259. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876. 
260. See supra notes 28-106 and accompanying text. 
261. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)). 
262. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
263. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 856-57 ("Credit .card verification is only feasible, how-
ever, ... in connection with a commercial transaction in which the card is used .... "). 
264. The economic burdens would include the costs of special software applications 
and secure servers, as well as the costs of verification. Affidavits submitted by plaintiffs 
in the lawsuit challenging COP A estimate that the cost for credit card verification could 
be as high as $200,000 per month for a site that receives approximately 100,000 users 
per month. 
265. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217 (invalidating a city requirement that outdoor 
theater owners "construct adequate protective fencing which may be extremely expen-
sive or even physically impracticable"); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115-16 ("A stat-
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Validation by debit card266 would also require a financial transac-
tion, and thus, is unavailable to content providers who provide their 
speech for free. Similarly, requiring speakers to set up an adult iden-
tification system267 or a system to accept "digital certificates"268 
before they can provide free content is technologically and economi-
cally infeasible for the vast majority of content providers covered by 
COP A. As the district court pointed out in Reno, the cost of creating 
and maintaining an age verification system "would be prohibitive even 
for a commercial entity such as HotWired, the online version of Wired 
magazine."26 9 What is more, age verification requirements would 
likely have an adverse effect on revenue for "commercial" content 
providers, as advertisers depend upon a demonstration that the sites 
are widely available and frequently visited.2 70 
Digital certificate technology, another defense held out by COPA, 
is not currently in widespread use, and may not become universally 
adopted for a considerable time, if ever. COPA also provides a "catch-
all" type of affirmative defense for Web publishers who take "other 
reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology''271 
to restrict access to materials by minors. As noted in Part II, however, 
there are currently no other "reasonable measures" that allow content 
providers to limit their speech to adults. 272 The "catchall" defense in 
fact catches nothing. Both the digital certificate and "other reasonable 
measures" defenses, therefore, depend entirely upon the prospects of 
future technology. Just as the Reno Court rejected the argument that 
future technological advances could be used to narrow the CDA, so too 
will courts find the government's rosy predictions of prospective tech-
ute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial 
burden on speakers because of the content of their speech" because such regulation 
"raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or view-
points from the marketplace."). 
266. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)(A)). 
267. See id. 
268. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(l)(B)). 
269. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 847. 
270. As the Pennsylvania district court recently concluded in granting a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of COPA: 
Evidence presented to this Court is likely to establish at trial that the imple-
mentation of credit card or adult verification screens in front of material that is 
harmful to minors may deter users from accessing such materials and that the 
loss of users of such material may affect the speakers' economic ability to pro-
vide such communications .... The plaintiffs are likely to establish at trial that 
under COPA, Web site operators and content providers may feel an economic 
disincentive to engage in communications that are or may be considered to be 
harmful to minors and thus, may self-censor the content of their sites. 
Memorandum and order of Reed, J., ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-5591 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (on file 
with author). 
271. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(l)(C)). 
272. See supra ntoes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
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nological advances insufficient to justify Congress's latest attempt to 
enact a statute criminalizing speech. Future technology cannot save a 
statute that criminalizes a wide array of speech today. 
On a more fundamental level, affirmative defenses do little to 
limit the inevitable chilling effect that the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion will inevitably have on free speech. Once a criminal prosecution 
begins, it is small consolation to a defendant that he or she may prove 
innocence by falling into one of the "safe harbors" provided by COPA. 
Moreover, COPA's defenses are no more available for the vast major-
ity of Web speakers than those found wanting in Reno. In fact, none of 
COPA's affirmative defenses are available to the Web speakers who 
are likely to be most affected by the statute - those who provide con-
tent for free, but who seek to make a profit from their sites. These 
speakers are left with no way to comply with COPA. Thus, they are 
left with two equally untenable alternatives: (1) risk prosecution and 
heavy civil penalties under COPA, or (2) attempt to engage in self-
censorship and thereby deny adults and older minors access to consti-
tutionally protected speech. 
Congress assumed, incorrectly, that COPA's affirmative defenses 
would be widely available to most Web content providers. That as-
sumption was, in turn, based upon an underlying assumption that 
COPA would not affect persons who provide free content on the Web: 
Those who sell pornographic content for a living, Congress apparently 
reasoned, can afford to limit their audience by credit card or some 
other form of age verification. As I have explained, however, Con-
gress' underlying assumption was also a fatal miscalculation. By 
sweeping within the definition of "commercial" speech a substantial 
number of speakers who seek to make a profit, but nevertheless pro-
vide content on the Web for free, Congress effectively eviscerated the 
affirmative defenses provided by COPA for millions of Web speakers, 
Oddly, it appears that Congress recognized that it was regulating 
in disregard of technological advances. At the same time it enacted 
COPA, Congress created a temporary "Commission on Online Child 
Protection"273 for the purpose of "conducting a study ... regarding 
methods to help reduce access by minors to material that is harmful to 
minors on the Internet."2 74 Congress charged the Commission with 
identifying and analyzing the various technological tools and methods 
for protecting minors from harmful material, many of which were dis-
273. The Commission is to be composed of nineteen members chosen from a cross-
section of the Internet business community, including Internet access services, repre-
sentatives of businesses that provide Internet filtering or blocking services, content 
providers, and persons engaged in the business of providing ratings, labeling, and do-
main name services. See H.R. REP. No. 105-11242 § 1406(c) (1998) (uncodified). 
274. H.R. REP. No. 105-11242 § 1406(c). 
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cussed in Part II of this article, including filtering or blocking 
software, age verification systems, rating systems, the establishment 
of a domain name for posting any material that is harmful to minors, 
and any other existing or proposed technologies. 275 
Thus, Congress created a commission to study after the enact-
ment of a restrictive criminal statute what it undoubtedly should have 
studied beforehand: the technology available to restrict minors' access 
to "harmful" materials on the Internet, and the costs associated with 
that technology. Armed only with whatever technological background 
knowledge it had when the CDA was passed, Congress mistakenly 
proceeded in literal fashion to tinker with the language of COPA to 
address some of the Reno Court's concerns. Legislators failed, how-
ever, to heed the Court's broader warning that they must proceed with 
the utmost caution and become fully informed of the state of cyber-
space technology before regulating the content of speech on this vast 
new communicative medium, particularly if the government regula-
tion is to take the form of a criminal statute. Contrary to the Supreme 
Court's clear directive, Congress' Internet speech restriction has once 
again outpaced the state-of-the-art. 
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he level of discourse reach-
ing a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable 
for a sandbox."276 Because COPA, like the CDA, would result in limit-
ing communications on the Web to those suitable only for children, it 
is not a narrowly tailored method for protecting children from "harm-
ful" materials.277 Thus, the fatal constitutional flaw for COPA, as it 
was for the CDA, is that "in order to deny minors access to potentially 
harmful speech," the law "effectively suppresses a large amount of 
275. In analyzing these technologies, the Commission is required specifically to ex-
amine the costs associated with the various methods of restricting minors' access to 
harmful materials, the effects of those technologies on users' privacy, and the extent to 
which harmful material is globally distributed and the effects of existing and proposed 
technology on such distribution. See H.R. REP. No. 105-11242 § 1406(c). The Commis-
sion is required to submit a report to Congress containing the results of its study within 
one year of COP A's enactment. 
276. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983). See Butler v. Mich-
igan, 352 U.S. 380, 381, 383-84 (1957) (striking down a ban on material "manifestly 
tending to the corruption of the morals of youth"). 
277. In addition to limiting adults' access to constitutionally protected speech, 
COPA also restricts access by older minors to speech that is constitutionally protected 
as to them. COPA draws no distinction between minors who are six or eight years old 
and those who are sixteen or seventeen years old. Information concerning topics such 
as gay and lesbian issues, safe sex, and women's health may be deemed "harmful" to 
younger minors, but would be quite valuable to older minors. The First Amendment 
protects the rights of minors to receive information and ideas necessary to their devel-
opment and participation as citizens. See Carey v. Population Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 
678, 693, 700-02 (1977). 
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speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to ad-
dress to one another."278 
4. Efficacy And Less Restrictive Alternatives 
Apart from its overbroad scope, COPA is an ineffective means of 
achieving the government's asserted interest in protecting children 
from "harmful" materials. Strict scrutiny requires that a law be inval-
idated "if it provides only ineffective or remote support for the govern-
ment's purpose."279 Under this analysis, the government must 
demonstrate that a statute will in fact alleviate the alleged harms in a 
"direct and material" way.zso 
It appears that Congress, in enacting COPA, sought primarily to 
prohibit the distribution of "pornographic" images over the Web by 
commercial pornographers. Even if it can be assumed that Congress's 
intent may be so narrowly construed, the statute would have little ef-
fect even on this limited category of ''harmful" materials. Existing 
laws already punish the distribution and importation over the In-
ternet of the most ''harmful" material - "obscenity'' and "child por-
nography."281 The vast majority of the remaining category of 
''harmful" material is not provided on the Internet for free, but rather 
is provided only after a fee is paid. Thus, ironically, purveyors of this 
material are already purportedly protected under COPA's credit card 
affirmative defense. COPA also allows the distribution of pornogra-
phy so long as it is communicated by "noncommercial" entities. Thus, 
the only ''harmful" material really affected by COPA's prohibitions is 
that which is provided for free and conveys frank, useful information 
concerning matters of sexuality. Finally, even as to the so-called 
"commercial" sites, many minors have access to credit cards, and there 
is no evidence that an artful minor could not pose as an adult in order 
to gain access to "harmful" material. 
In addition, Congress also left unresolved another significant 
problem with the CDA- the regulation of "harmful" materials posted 
abroad. The nature of the Web makes it highly unlikely that COPA 
will be effective at ridding it of "harmful" material. The Web, like the 
278. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874. 
279. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980). 
280. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994). As Justice Scalia 
wrote in his concurrence in Florida Star v. B.J.F., "a law cannot be regarded as ... 
justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, when it leaves appreciable damage to [the 
government's] supposedly vital interest unprohibited." Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 
524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
281. See 18 U.S.C. § 522 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (addressing the importation of 
obscenity); Id. § 1460 (addressing obscenity); Id. § 2251 (dealing ·with child 
pornography). 
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Internet as a whole, is global in nature. Thus, material posted on the 
Web by an overseas speaker will be just as available to minors as ma-
terial that is posted in the United States. · COPA, like the CDA, will 
not prevent minors from gaining access to the large percentage of ma-
terial that originates abroad. 282 
In reality, therefore, COPA will prevent minors from accessing 
only a very small category of "harmful" materials (while at the same 
time having the unconstitutional effect of preventing adults and older 
minors from receiving and communicating constitutionally protected 
materials). Minors would be prohibited from accessing only material 
that: (1) is not already illegal under existing obscenity and child por-
nography laws; (2) does not require payment; (3) is not communicated 
by amateurs with no profit motive; and (4) is not provided by overseas 
content providers.283 As the government cannot meet its burden of 
establishing that COPA alleviates the alleged "harms in a direct and 
material way,"284 COPA leaves "appreciable damage to [the] suppos-
edly vital interest unprohibited."285 
To survive strict scrutiny, COPA must not only be an effective 
means, but also the least restrictive means, of achieving Congress' ob-
jective.286 However, as discussed in detail in Part II, there are a host 
of alternative means available that restrict minors' access to ''harm-
ful" material without preventing adults from accessing such material. 
America Online and Prodigy, for example, offer features that prevent 
children from accessing chat rooms and block access to Web sites and 
discussion groups based upon key words, subject matter, or content. 
In addition, a growing number of Internet Service Providers offer pre-
filtered access for users. In addition to blocking pornography, these 
282. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 878 n.45. 
283. The Justice Department opined that diverting law enforcement resources from 
ongoing criminal obscenity investigations to COPA prosecutions would be particularly 
ill-advised given the uncertainty concerning COP A's efficacy. The Department stated in 
its letter to Congress: 
There are thousands of newsgroups and Internet relay chat channels on which 
anyone can access pornography; and children would still be able to obtain ready 
access to pornography from a myriad of overseas web sites. The COPA appar-
ently would not attempt to address those sources oflnternet pornography .... 
The practical or legal difficulty in addressing these considerable alternative 
sources from which children can obtain pornography raises questions about the 
efficacy of the COPA and the availability of expending scarce resources on its 
enforcement. 
See 144 Cong. Rec. S12796 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (letter from L. Anthony Sutin, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General). 
284. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 664. 
285. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541-42. 
286. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 ("It is not enough to show that the Government's 
ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends."). 
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filters screen for violent content, drug-related information and certain 
forms of hate speech. 
There are also numerous user-based software applications that 
allow users to block access to certain Web sites. These programs· are 
not a perfect solution; some applications screen too broadly, blocking 
valuable Web sites, while others fail to screen all inappropriate mate-
rial. But user-based software applications are a far less restrictive al-
ternative than COPA's criminal censorship of protected speech.287 
Indeed, Congress recognized the usefulness of these alternatives when 
it enacted COPA and required that Internet Service Providers "notify 
[all new customers] that parental control protections (such as com-
puter hardware, software or filtering services) are commercially avail-
able that may assist the customer in limiting access to material that is 
harmful to minors."288 
In addition to preserving parental control over minors' access to 
Web content, user-based programs are a far more effective means of 
achieving Congress' objective of restricting minors' access to "harmful" 
materials. User-based applications allow parents to shield minors 
from sexually oriented materials that originate abroad or from ama-
teur or non-commercial sites, as well as from sites that require a 
credit card for payment. Had Congress allowed its Commission to 
study these alternatives prior to passing a content-based criminal 
statute, the Commission would likely have advised that a user-based 
287. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877; Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 758 (declaring that infor-
mational requirements and user-based blocking are more narrowly tailored than 
speaker-based schemes as a means of limiting minors' access to indecent materials). 
See also Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 787 
(3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that pre-blocking of dial-a-porn calls was less restrictive 
means of protecting children than requirement that adults apply for access codes to 
receive such messages). In Fabulous Associates, the Third Circuit rejected the Com-
monwealth's argument that access codes were more effective than pre-blocking, since 
children could request unblocking and thereby gain access to sexually explicit messages. 
The court concluded that "(i]n this respect, the decision a parent must make is compara-
ble to whether to keep sexually explicit books on the shelf or subscribe to adult 
magazines. No constitutional principle is implicated. The responsibility for making 
such choices is where our society has traditionally placed it - on the shoulders of the 
parent." Fabulous Assocs., 896 F.2d at 787. 
288. COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)). Of course, Congress is free to fur-
ther its interests by educating the public about the benefits and dangers of the Internet 
and, more particularly, the Web. As the Supreme Court noted in Denver Area, "infor-
mational requirements" and user-based blocking are more narrowly tailored than 
speaker-based schemes as a means of limiting minors' access to offensive or harmful 
material. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 757-58. Congress recognized the value of such edu-
cational efforts when it enacted the CDA. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-104, § 552(1), 110 Stat. 142 (encouraging establishment of "technology fund" to 
support development of user-based blocking technology and public education). 
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solution is a preferable means of screening minors' access to inappro-
priate content on the Web.289 
5. Vagueness Problems 
While not likely to be a separate ground for invalidating the stat-
ute, courts will likely frown upon COPA for the additional reason that 
its terms create uncertainty for speakers faced with the prospect of a 
criminal prosecution.290 Like the CDA, COPA is vague in several sig-
nificant respects. 
First, COPA fails to define the relevant community that will set 
the standard for what is ''harmful to minors" on the global Web. The 
community might be the local community that is viewing the speech or 
the community of adults communicating on the Web. If the standard 
is the former, how can a speaker who operates a Web site in New York 
predict what prosecutors in Alabama or Kansas might deem ''harmful 
to minors?"291 Absent some guidance as to the relevant community, 
speakers will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . than if the 
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."292 
Second, COPA fails to define the relevant age of the minor for pur-
poses of determining whether material is ''harmful to minors." It is 
not clear whether COPA prohibits material that lacks value for all 
minors, for some minors, or for some variation of the "average" or "rea-
sonable" sixteen-year-old. It is unclear whether minors of a certain 
289. The Pennsylvania district court concluded in its Memorandum enjoining en-
forcement of COPA that besides the fact that effective blocking software exists, there 
are other respects in which COPA is not the least restrictive means for achieving Con-
gress's apparent objective of shielding children from on-line pornography. The court 
noted that the "sweeping category" of forms of content prohibited under COPA - in-
cluding "any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writ-
ing, or other matter of any kind" - "could have been less restrictive of speech on the 
Web and more narrowly tailored to Congress's goal of shielding minors from porno-
graphic teasers if the prohibited forms of content had included, for instance, only pic-
tures, images, or graphic image files, which are typcially employed by adult 
entertainment Web sites as 'teasers.'" Memorandum and Order of Reed, J., at 29 Reno 
(No. 98-5591) (on file with author). The district court also opined that Congress could 
have proceeded without imposition of "possibly excessive and serious criminal penal-
ties" for communicating speech that is protected as to adults. See id. 
290. The Reno Court pointed out that the vagueness of the CDA was "a matter of 
special concern for tow reasons." Reno, 521 U.S. at 871. First, the statute was a con-
tent-based restriction on speech, which has an "obvious chilling effect on free speech." 
ld. at 872. Second, the CDA was a criminal statute. In addition to the "opprobrium and 
stigma of a criminal conviction," the CDA imposed severe fines on the prohibited com-
munications. ld.; see Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (stating that 
"[n)o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the mean-
ing of penal statutes") (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)). 
291. One of the judges on the district court panel in Reno would have held that the 
CDA was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the relevant community for 
determining "indecency." See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 863. 
292. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). 
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age can discern any ''value," whether social, political, or literary, in 
certain materials. A speaker who attempts to satisfy COPA's "harm-
ful to minors" standard may be assigned the hopelessly difficult task 
of determining whether its content contains "value" for an eight-year-
old. Again, this uncertainty, coupled with the threat of criminal pros-
ecution and substantial fines, will substantially restrict the speech 
that is made available on the Web. 
Third, the definition of "harmful to minors" actually used in 
COPA is vague in at least one respect. The phrase "considered as a 
whole," which is part of the "serious value" prong of the Miller test, is 
nearly impossible to apply to online communications. As discussed in 
Part II, Web sites are comprised of thousands of linked documents, 
images, and texts, simultaneously presented through an ad-hoc link-
ing process. COPA offers no guidance as to how a speaker is to treat 
or the government to define the "work as a whole" for purposes of the 
"harmful to minors" test. 
Finally, COPA provides for enhanced penalties for "intentional" 
versus "knowing" violations, yet fails to define the distinction between 
the two types of violations.293 Nor is there any indication from Con-
gress as to why the two distinct penalty provisions are necessary or 
desirable. It might be that an "intentional" violation entails active 
promotion of"harmful" materials to an audience of minors. In the ab-
sence of any clear definition, however, speakers cannot know how to 
avoid prosecution for "intentional" violations. 
All of these additional concerns will cause courts to view COPA 
with skepticism. As the Reno Court determined, a content-based 
criminal speech restriction ought to present very clear guidelines for 
speakers who are faced with heavy penalties for non-compliance. 
COPA, like the CDA, fails to meet this requirement. 
6. COPA's Effect On Users and the Medium 
Even if technology allowed speakers to effectively use credit cards, 
debit cards or other methods to verify the age of users, such require-
ments would fundamentally alter the nature and values of the Web, 
which is characterized by spontaneous, instantaneous, albeit often un-
predictable, communication by hundreds of thousands of individual 
speakers around the globe. Without the access barriers imposed by 
COPA, the Web provides an affordable and often seamless means of 
accessing an enormous and diverse body of information, ideas and 
viewpoints. While the Supreme Court has allowed reasonably narrow 
regulations of speech communicated over various media, it has never 
293. See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(l)-(2)). 
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upheld a speech restriction that fundamentally alters the very nature 
of the medium. 
COPA would prevent or deter possibly hundreds of thousands of 
readers from accessing protected speech, even if it were feasible for 
speakers to set up a system to verify age. Readers who do not have 
the necessary identification would be denied access. Many adults do 
not have a credit card, and many foreign users are even less likely to 
have a credit card or other necessary identification. Further, many 
users will not want to provide personal information to obtain speech 
for free. In striking down the CDA, the Supreme Court noted that 
"[t]here is evidence suggesting that adult users, particularly casual 
Web browsers, would be discouraged from retrieving information that 
required use of a credit card or password."294 Users may not want to 
disclose their credit card numbers unless they are actually making a 
purchase. 
In addition, COPA's registration requirement would prevent 
users from accessing information anonymously, and would thus deter 
many users from accessing sensitive or controversial speech covered 
by COPA.295 The Supreme Court recently invalidated a similar "re-
gistration" requirement as applied to cable viewers. In Denver Area 
Educations Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 296 the Supreme 
Court struck down a statutory requirement that viewers provide writ-
ten notice to cable operators if they want access to certain sexually 
oriented programs, because the requirement "restrict[s] viewing by 
subscribers who fear for their reputations should the operator, adver-
tently or inadvertently, disclose the list of those who wish to watch 
the ... channel."297 Requiring that Web speakers register their users 
by credit card or adult identification on pain of felony conviction and 
onerous civil :fines is a more onerous burden than the scheme held un-
constitutional in Denver Area.29B 
294. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857 n.23. 
295. See Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 356-57 (1995) (invalidat-
ing Ohio statute prohibiting anonymous distribution of campaign literature); see also 
Lam.ont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (invalidating requirement that 
recipients of communist literature notify post office that they wish to receive such 
materials). Mcintyre establishes a limited protection for anonymous speech. The Court 
was explicit that the opinion reached "only written communications and, particularly, 
leaflets of the kind Mrs. Mcintyre distributed." Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 338 n.3. The case 
does not, therefore, settle the right of the government to regulate anonymity. 
296. 518 u.s. 727 (1996). 
297. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996). 
298. See Fabulous Assocs. v. Penn. Pub. Uti!. Comm'n, 896 F.2d 780, 785 (3d Cir. 
1990) (holding that the First Amendment "protects against governmental 'inhibition as 
well as prohibition.' An identification requirement exerts an inhibitory effect and such 
deterrence raises First Amendment issues comparable to those raised by direct state 
imposed burdens or restrictions.") (quoting Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 60, 64-
65 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
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Congress's objective of protecting children from materials deemed 
"harmful" to their physical and psychological well-being is certainly 
compelling. However, the First Amendment states that "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Despite good 
intentions, COPA abridges a substantial amount of protected speech 
provided on the Internet for free. The statute must therefore be inval-
idated. Indeed, as the district court recently noted in enjoining en-
forcement of COPA, "perhaps we do the minors of this country harm if 
First Amendment protections, which they will with age inherit fully, 
are chipped away in the name of their protection."299 
V. SOLVING THE INTRACTABLE PORNOGRAPHY DILEMMA 
Congress, confronted with the Internet's intractable pornography 
problem, has three options. First, it might refine COPA in order to 
more narrowly prohibit the speech it apparently finds objectionable ~ 
"teasers," or pornographic images provided for free on Web sites that 
sell pornography for profit. Second, Congress could wait for the state 
of the art, specifically computer code that establishes geography and 
identity, to advance to the point where cyberzoning meets the require-
ments of real space law. Finally, Congress could choose to do nothing, 
relying instead upon market-based solutions, such as user-based 
blocking software to zone Internet pornography. I shall discuss these 
options in turn. While I fear that Congress, for political reasons, will 
focus on the first, I believe that the Internet and its users would be 
better served by Congressional restraint. 
A. A MoRE NARROWLY TAILORED ALTERNATIVE TO COPA 
Assuming that Congress's primary purpose in enacting COPA 
was to shield children from the pornographic "teasers" placed on Web 
sites to lure visitors inside,300 a statute narrowly tailored to serve that 
purpose can readily be drafted. Three changes ought to be made to 
COPA in order to satisfy the mandates of the First Amendment. 
First, Congress should narrow the categories of speech that fall 
within the statute. COPA prohibits "[a]ny communication, picture, 
299. See Memorandum Granting Preliminary Injunction, ACLU v. Reno, No. 98-
5591 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1999) (on file with author). 
300. This, indeed, would appear to have been Congress's intent. COPA does not 
apply to Web publishers who make pornographic images available for free to all who 
visit the site. Only those who include such materials on their sites "as a regular course 
oftrade or business" are subject to COP A's penalties. As the House Committee on Com-
merce noted in its report, "even though some Web sites contain warnings that the mate-
rial on that Web site is adult-oriented, most provide no warnings, or if they do provide a 
warning, there is sexually explicit material on the same page as the warning." H.R. 
REP. No. 105-775, at ?0-21 (1998). 
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image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other matter 
of any kind" that is obscene or "harmful to .minors."301 A far less re-
strictive statute would prohibit only "harmful" pictures, images, or 
graphic image files, which are typically employed by commercial 
pornographers as "teasers" on their sites. Limiting the regulated 
forms of content to pictures and the like would eliminate from the 
threat of prosecution a vast array of Internet content providers who 
provide frank discussions and written educational materials on such 
topics as safer sex and abortion. 
Second, Congress should alter the ''value" prong of the Miller test 
in various respects. It should exempt from coverage any image or 
graphic image file that, standing alone, has serious artistic, educa-
tional, medical or scientific value for any minor. Three distinct 
changes to COPA are contemplated here. COPA, incorporating a mod-
ified Miller test, subjects a publisher to prosecution for making avail-
able on a Web site any "communication," etc., that "taken as a whole, 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for mi-
nors."302 The first proposed alteration is to require that each image or 
graphic image file be judged on its own merits, and not "taken as a 
whole." The "taken as a whole" formulation is unworkable in cyber-
space, as it is difficult to define what the "whole" consists of on a Web 
site that contains numerous links to other sites and is divided into 
many files of its own. "Teasers," or whatever other images prosecutors 
believe fall within the strictures of the statute, should stand or fall 
based upon a viewing conducted in isolation. The second proposed al-
teration is to add both an "educational" and "medical" component to 
the values listed in Miller and COP A. Pictures of condoms, for exam-
ple, and instructions concerning how to use them, may have no "ar-
tisitic" or "scientific" value for minors, but undoubtedly have an 
educational or medical value that is potentially life-saving. The third 
alteration I propose to the ''value" component of the Miller test is to 
exempt any image or picture that has value as to any minor. COPA 
does not distinguish between minors who are very young and those on 
the cusp of adulthood. Thus, an image that may have some artistic or 
other value for a sixteen-year-old is still prohibited, as it may have no 
such value at all from the perspective of a very young minor. The pro-
posed alteration would protect the constitutional rights of older mi-
nors to view materials that may be deemed ''harmful" to their much 
younger counterparts. 
Finally, Congress should abandon the criminalization paradigm 
of the CDA and COP A. Congress's goals could be served without im-
301. · See COPA (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)). 
302. See id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)(C)). 
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position of excessive criminal penalties for communication of speech 
that is protected as to adults. Violations of zoning laws in real space 
result in civil penalties. There is no reason, save politics, to deviate 
from this approach in cyberspace. 
I believe that the proposed alterations would save COPA from in-
validation under the First Amendment. The proposed statute would 
serve Congress's goals of protecting children from pornographic 
images made available for free on commercial pornography sites, 
while protecting the rights of minors, particularly older minors, to re-
ceive images that have educational, artistic, or scientific value. 
B. FROM BORDERS TO BOUNDARIES 
Of course, the fact that Congress could enact a speech-restrictive 
statute that passes First Amendment scrutiny does not mean that it 
ought to do so. At least, it does not mean that Congress ought to do so 
now. Zoning is anathema to cyberspace. The near anarchy of the In-
ternet provides no means for putting people or speech in their proper 
place. Indeed, they have no "proper place" there. The architecture of 
cyberspace allows everyone to move freely and to consume information 
without boundaries or walls. 
In the absence of natural boundaries, however, Congress has 
stepped in to regulate the anarchy - to attempt to graft onto 
cyberspace the concepts of geography and identity, or what Professor 
Lessig has called "the architecture of real space."303 There are 
many who prefer the Net as it is now, a world in which informa-
tion flows freely across borders, but cannot be stopped by bound-
aries or walls. But make no mistake - zoning is coming to cyber-
space. As Professor Lessig, who laments the trend, has noted, "the 
Web is becoming a place where the discriminations of real space 
get automated in a technology of zoning."304 The technology of zon-
ing promises to be far more precise than any analog that exists 
in real space. In contrast to legislative code, computer code 
will someday infallibly discriminate in the distribution of, and 
access to, pornography and other information on the Internet.305 
303. Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 
886 (1996). 
304. Lessig, 45 EMORY L.J. at 889. 
305. Professor Lessig has noted that the trend toward perfect zoning is occurring on 
the Internet without governmental intervention: 
Quite without governmental mandate, and indeed, without anything like a cen-
tralized process of decision, cyberspace is already becoming something quite 
different from what I have described. It is moving, that is, from a relatively 
unzoned place to a universe that is extraordinarily well zoned. The architec-
ture of cyberspace - the software that constitutes it - is becoming quite 
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More succinctly put: "Law as code is a start to the perfect techno-
logy of justice."306 
Unlike Professor Lessig and others, I am not troubled by the in-
troduction of zoning into cyberspace. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
the anarchy that presently characterizes the Internet continuing in 
perpetuity, particularly if the Internet is to become a democratic fo-
rum for the dissemination of information and a major vehicle for com-
merce. Governments patrol borders as an attribute of their 
sovereignty, both to apprehend violators of the law and to control the 
effects of materials that cross borders. 307 They cannot serve these 
compelling interests without some means of exerting "physical" con-
trol over their subjects. The best means for doing so, whether in real 
space or cyberspace, is to create and regulate effective boundaries and 
walls. 
As of yet, there are no definitive boundaries in cyberspace. Like 
much else in cyberspace, the borders that exist are rather permeable 
and rudimentary. The Internet's borders are largely the result of cus-
tom, and they have not yet hardened into boundaries or walls. Cyber-
space customs are likely to change, however, and to do so with some 
frequency and rapidity. In other words, the Net's architecture is 
unsettled. 
Nevertheless, just as cyberspace is taking shape, Congress has 
stepped in with the CDA and COPA, two zoning laws through which 
lawmakers sought to transport real space zoning principles to cyber-
space. The difficulty with Congress's approach to the Internet's por-
nography dilemma to this point has been the prematurity of its 
regulation. More fundamentally, it has been Congress's inability to 
grasp just what it is regulating, and how technology - that other 
"code" about which Professor Lessig has written so eloquently -lim-
its its power to regulate cyberspace within the bounds of the First 
Amendment. 
This does not mean that Congress is forever foreclosed from regu-
lating, or zoning, speech outside real space. As zoning comes to cyber-
space, boundaries and walls will develop and Congress, along with the 
states, will undoubtedly step in to exert some measure of control over 
the materials crossing those boundaries. As Justice O'Connor noted 
in her concurring opinion in Reno, one of the distinguishing features of 
quickly far better at facilitating discriminations in access and distribution than 
any equivalent technologies in real space. 
ld. at 888. 
306. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1408 (1996). 
307. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1369-70 (1996) (explaining why "geographic borders 
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the Internet is the malleability of its architecture. She stated: "Cyber-
space is malleable. Thus, it is possible to construct barriers in cyber-
space and use them to screen for identity, making cyberspace more 
like the physical world and, consequently, more amenable to zoning 
laws."308 Boundaries and walls can be constructed, torn down, re-con-
figured and relocated with a few changes in the regulating computer 
software. Formal and informal zones operate effectively in real space, 
because features like geography and identity are found there. These 
features, as their description in Part II demonstrates, are not found in 
cyberspace- they are made. They have not been made yet, at least 
not to an extent that renders them susceptible to speech restrictions 
like the CDA and COP A. It is as if the government were framing the 
portrait when the world was still painting the object to be framed. 
Thus far, Congress has proceeded hastily in this rapidly develop-
ing and highly uncertain environment. Lawmakers have enough diffi-
culty criminalizing speech in the settled architecture of the real world. 
Congress raises the stakes significantly by forcing publishers in cyber-
space to self-censor or suffer lengthy jail terms and heavy fines. This 
is, fortunately, not the only course available. Indeed, if it is willing to 
exercise some patience, Congress will find that it need not legislate 
this type of broad, draconian zoning in order to be a meaningful par-
ticipant in shaping the architecture of the Internet. 
The first thing Congress ought to do before it takes up another 
Internet censorship law is to become educated as to what it is regulat-
ing and the options available to it. Hopefully, the Commission Con-
gress created when it passed COPA will thoroughly investigate the 
Internet's existing architecture and recommend plausible means for 
protecting children from "harmful" materials that are far less restric-
tive than COPA. It is unfortunate that the Commission was granted 
only one year to conduct its study and report its findings to Congress. 
As CDA and COPA demonstrate, the technological landscape may not 
change appreciably during the next year. Advances in user-based 
blocking software, rating systems, gateway technology, and domain 
name structure, to name only a few of the rapidly ·developing areas, 
are likely to require more incubation time to become effective alterna-
tives to the censorship path Congress has charted thus far. 
Like zoning in general, however, these changes are coming to the 
Internet. It will be technological advances, not Congressional man-
dates, that will finally solve the Internet's intractable pornography 
problem. Or, at least, it will be some cooperative effort between engi-
neers and lawmakers that allows Congress to regulate speech on the 
Internet within the bounds of the First Amendment. Congress' pri-
308. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 890 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
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mary goal in COPA and the CDA was to mandate that Web publishers 
discriminate in the access to pornography on the basis of user age. As 
indicated in Part II, advances on two separate fronts hold out great 
promise that the identity now missing from the Internet is forthcom-
ing. Rating systems, like the PICS system,309 are already being used 
by many publishers oflnternet pornography. Similarly, domain name 
proposals have been made that would establish a top-level domain for 
pornographic materials. What is needed is the development of a con-
sensus as to what ratings or domain name ought to be used, and what 
materials ought to fall within the rated categories or domain. PICS 
may well, in due time, provide that consensus as to ratings. In con-
junction with the move to ratings and perhaps additional domains, 
engineers continue to perfect user-based blocking software that will 
permit parents to block rated or domain-speCific cybersmut with far 
greater precision than Congress could ever hope to obtain through 
legislation. 
Of course, Congress cannot mandate that users purchase and in-
stall blocking software that will discriminate along the lines of an ac-
cepted rating system or domain name. But assuming some consensus 
can be reached, Congress could encourage sites to rate their content or 
place it within the chosen domain by punishing those who do not do 
so. It might even, at some point, establish a ratings Commission, 
along the lines of an FCC, to help forge some consensus as to the 
proper ratings to use in cyberspace. In other words, Congress can re-
quire that publishers zone their own materials in order to deny minors 
access to pornography on the Internet. This solution would resemble 
the much-debated ''V-chip" for television. While it would raise com-
plexities of its own, including the need to determine what content be-
longs where, the ratings and domain name solution would not be 
constitutionally suspect. 
c. PARENTAL ZONING 
There is another solution, however, that is even more attractive. 
If one accepts, as I do, that parents should determine in the first in-
stance what their children see on their home computer screen, then 
user-based blocking software will provide the "perfect technology of 
justice" of which Lessig writes. The software as it now exists allows 
parents to block all manner of pornography, whether in the form of 
images, words, or video, from their home computers. It is true that 
this code sometimes screens too broadly for words like "breast," but 
that seems a small price to pay in order to block the array of porno-
309. See supra note 104. 
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graphic images and text that children may encounter, whether inten-
tionally or by chance, on the Internet. 
Blocking software is as easy to install as using an ATM card, and 
is extremely difficult to disengage. Thus, unlike, say, credit card ver-
ification, it is a solution that children cannot easily end-run. In addi-
tion, user-based blocking software will be far more effective than 
legislative fiat in another respect: it will enable parents to block 
materials that are posted on overseas sites. Further, unlike COPA, 
user-based blocking software blocks materials from non-profit as well 
as commercial sites. 
I have some sympathy for the argument that it is the 
pornographers, not the parents, who ought to pay for the zoning of 
pornography. But the price to be paid under statutes like the CDA 
and COPA, including the debasement of the First Amendment and the 
loss of the fluidity that makes the Internet a unique and exciting form 
of communication, seems far greater than the modest sum concerned 
parents must expend to zone pornography from the desktop. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For all its focus on the Reno decision, Congress missed the 
Supreme Court's primary admonition that the legislature, rather than 
return to the drafting table after the failure of the CDA, should exhibit 
patience and allow the Internet's nascent technology to develop prior 
to embarking on yet another attempt at Internet speech regulation. 
In COPA, Congress did manage to improve upon the defects that 
doomed the CDA. But the improvements failed to address the princi-
ple barrier to content-based regulation of speech on the Internet. As 
yet, the characteristics of geography and identity that make possible 
the zoning of speech in real space do not exist in cyberspace. Until the 
technological state-of-the-art in cyberspace advances to meet the state 
of real space First Amendment law, Congress's attempts to zone 
speech in cyberspace will falter. 
The most Congress can expect to accomplish in the current envi-
ronment is passage of a narrowly drawn law that will place porno-
graphic "teasers" beyond the reach of most children. As the Justice 
Department pointed out before COPA was enacted, however, law en-
forcement resources are finite, and several statutes already prohibit 
the communication of the most harmful materials to children. Under 
the circumstances, Congress ought to practice the restraint urged 
upon it by the Reno Court. Nothing Congress has done, or is likely to 
do, can come close to matching the precision and effectiveness of the 
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market solutions, such as user-based blocking software, being devel-
oped by engineers. When such projects reach fruition, we shall see 
that the pornography problem on the Internet is not "intractable" af-
ter all. 
